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David Horton* & Reid Kress Weisbord** 
Abstract: The civil justice system has long struggled to resolve disputes over end-of-life 
transfers. The two most common grounds for challenging the validity of a gift, will, or trust—
mental incapacity and undue influence—are vague, hinge on the state of mind of a dead person, 
and allow factfinders to substitute their own norms and preferences for the donor’s intent. In 
addition, the slayer doctrine—which prohibits killers from inheriting from their victims—has 
generated decades of constitutional challenges. 
But recently, these controversial rules have migrated into an area where the stakes are 
significantly higher: the criminal justice system. For example, states have criminalized 
financial exploitation of an elder, which includes obtaining assets through undue influence. 
Likewise, prosecutors are bringing theft charges against people who accept transfers from 
mentally diminished owners. Finally, legislatures are experimenting with abuser statutes that 
extend the slayer doctrine by barring anyone from receiving property from the estate of a senior 
citizen whom they mistreated. 
This Article evaluates the benefits and costs of this trend. It explains that these new 
sanctions deter elder abuse: wrongdoing that is rampant, pernicious, and underreported. 
Nevertheless, this Article exposes the dangers of criminalizing this unique area of law. First, 
criminal undue influence and the abuser doctrine may be unconstitutional in some situations. 
Second, inheritance crimes suffer from the flaws that make probate litigation so unreliable. 
Third, because inheritance law and criminal law have been traditionally understood as distinct, 
jurisdictions have not yet figured out how to gracefully merge them. Finally, this Article builds 
on these insights to argue that states should abolish criminal undue influence, harmonize civil 
and criminal rules, and create exceptions to abuser laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1940s, a young Texan named Mary Ellen Bendtsen enjoyed a 
budding career as a model and musician.1 Bendtsen graced the cover of 
Cosmopolitan and performed for Cole Porter and Harry Truman.2 She was 
the “toast of Dallas society,” throwing lavish parties in her home, 4949 
Swiss Avenue.3 Bendtsen was deeply attached to her residence and made 
no secret that she intended to “go[] out feet-first.”4 As an old friend put it, 
“Mary Ellen was the house and the house was Mary Ellen.”5 
However, the glamour gradually faded. In 1985, Bendtsen’s husband 
died.6 Around 2000, Bendtsen began to behave erratically.7 4949 Swiss 
Avenue fell into disrepair.8 Tension flared between Bendtsen’s daughter, 
Frances Ann Giron, and one of Bendtsen’s close friends, Mark McCay.9 
In particular, Giron urged Bendtsen to move into a smaller house, saying 
that 4949 Swiss Avenue “gave [her] the creeps.”10 Conversely, McCay 
and his partner Justin Burgess—who Bendtsen called “the boys”—
coveted the mansion, and helped her maintain it.11 
On February 22, 2005, Bendtsen suffered a stroke.12 McCay, Burgess, 
and Edwin Olsen, a lawyer, raced to her hospital room.13 Olsen had 
drafted a will that left most of Bendsten’s estate, including 4949 Swiss 
Avenue, to McCay and Burgess.14 As McCay and Burgess stood at the 
foot of the bed, Olsen read this document aloud and helped Bendsten sign 
it with a mark.15 Eight days later, Bendtsen died.16 
 
1. See Andrew Paparella, ‘Mary Ellen’s Mansion’: Friendly Care – Or Con?, ABC NEWS (Nov. 
2, 2009, 7:23 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/2020/mary-ellens-mansion-elder-abuse/story?id= 
8974477 [https://perma.cc/85TE-HWWF]. 
2. Lee Hancock, A Saga of Fading Glory: Greed, Deception, Delusion - And One Woman’s Piece 
of Old East Dallas, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 13, 2006, at 1A, 2006 WLNR 14018329. 
3. Paparella, supra note 1.  
4. Id. 
5. Appellant’s Amended Redrawn Brief at 3, McCay v. State, 476 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App. 2015) 
(No. 05-12-01199-CR), 2014 WL 5849125, at *2 [hereinafter McCay Brief].  
6. See Hancock, supra note 2.  
7. See id.  
8. See id.  
9. See id.  
10. Id. 
11. See id.  
12. See McCay v. State, 476 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. App. 2015). 
13. See id.  
14. See id.  
15. See id.  
16. Id. 
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What happened next is a familiar part of the American succession 
process. Giron filed a lawsuit in probate court seeking to nullify the will.17 
She alleged that Bendsten lacked mental capacity, that McCay and 
Burgess had exerted undue influence, and that Olsen had not followed the 
formalities of the state Wills Act.18 The judge ultimately sided with Giron, 
refusing to enforce the document because it had not been signed by two 
witnesses in Bendsten’s presence as Texas law requires.19 In this way, 
Bendsten’s case was not unusual. Indeed, conflict is so endemic in 
end-of-life planning that wills are “more apt to be the subject of litigation 
than any other legal instrument.”20 
But then the matter took an unprecedented turn. After the probate case 
ended, prosecutors charged McCay with attempted theft.21 Observing that 
Texas defines “theft” as acquiring property without the owner’s “effective 
consent,” the government argued that “the boys” had tried to trick the 
incapacitated Bendsten into leaving them her property.22 McCay objected 
that the state was impermissibly trying “to criminalize a will contest.”23 
And indeed, at trial, the prosecution’s own expert witness admitted that 
he “had never encountered a situation where the losing party in a will 
contest was subsequently charged with a crime.”24 Nevertheless, a jury 
found McCay guilty and the court sentenced him to ten years in prison.25 
The civil justice system has long struggled to resolve disputes about 
inheritances.26 These cases suffer from the “worst evidence” problem: 
they hinge on the intent of a dead property owner, who cannot take the 
witness stand to “authenticate or clarify his declarations, which may have 
been made years, even decades past.”27 Likewise, the two most 
 
17. See Brief of Appellee at 5, Olsen v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 347 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App. 
2011) (No. 05-09-00945-CV), 2010 WL 3141562, at *5. 
18. See id.; In re Estate of Bendtsen, 230 S.W.3d 823, 827 (Tex. App. 2007). 
19. See id. at 826.  
20. Leon Jaworski, The Will Contest, Address Delivered to American College of Trial Lawyers 
(Apr. 16, 1958), in 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 87, 88 (1958).   
21. See McCay, 476 S.W.3d at 643. The case does not explain why the state declined to 
charge Burgess. 
22. Id. at 645 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(b)(1) (West Supp. 2014)).  
23. Id. at 646.  
24. McCay Brief, supra note 5, at 13 n.14.  
25. See McCay, 476 S.W.3d at 643–44, 653.  
26. Cf. Jaworski, supra note 20, at 88 (observing that “a will is more apt to be the subject of 
litigation than any other legal instrument”). 
27. John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference 
with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 344 (2013) (first quoting John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 
103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2046 (1994) [hereinafter Langbein, Will Contests]; and then quoting John H. 
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492 (1975) [hereinafter 
Langbein, Substantial Compliance]). 
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commonly-asserted grounds for trying to invalidate a gift, will, or trust—
mental incapacity and undue influence—are notoriously vague.28 Scholars 
have demonstrated that judges and juries purporting to apply these 
doctrines ignore the decedent’s wishes and strike down transfers that 
violate their “own views of morality and propriety.”29 In turn, because 
factfinders believe “that people should provide for their families,”30 they 
are suspicious of “the ‘abhorrent’ testator” who leaves property at death 
to “a non-mainstream religion, a radical political organization, or a same-
sex romantic partner.”31 Finally, even the slayer rule—the sensible-
seeming principle that killers cannot inherit from their victims—has 
inspired waves of constitutional litigation since the late 1800s.32 These 
troublesome doctrines exemplify the “the deep disorder that afflicts the 
administration of justice in the wealth transfer process in the 
United States.”33 
Yet as the battle over Bendsten’s estate reveals, the same rules that 
make probate litigation so controversial have quietly spread to a field 
 
28. See infra section I.A. 
29. ELIAS CLARK, LOUIS LUSKY, ARTHUR W. MURPHY, MARK L. ASCHER & GRAYSON M.P. 
MCCOUCH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, 
TRUSTS, GIFTS, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 231 (5th ed. 2007); cf. Bd. of 
Foreign Missions of Presbyterian Church v. Bevan, 2 Ohio App. 182, 193 (1913) (“The verdict in this 
case can not [sic] be accounted for on any theory other than prejudice of the jury.”), aff’d sub nom. 
Bevan v. Bd. of Foreign Missions of Presbyterian Church in U.S., 110 N.E. 1054 (Ohio 1914). 
30. Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1997). 
31. E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from 
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 275, 
282 (1999) (footnotes omitted); see also Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 
80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 210–11 (2001) (“Bequests to individuals other than ‘natural objects of the 
decedent’s bounty’—essentially family members—raise judicial red flags, even when the beneficiary 
was the decedent’s dependent or primary caregiver.” (footnotes omitted)); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue 
Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 267 (1981) ([T]here is at least some 
evidence to suggest that a homosexual testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to his lover stands 
in greater risk of having his testamentary plans overturned . . . .”).  
32. See infra section I.B. For prominent articles on the slayer rule, see James Barr Ames, Can a 
Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It?, 45 AM. L. REG. & REV. 225 (1897); J. Chadwick, 
A Testator’s Bounty to His Slayer, 30 L.Q. REV. 211 (1914); Nili Cohen, The Slayer Rule, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 793 (2012); Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 489 (1986); William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. 
REV. 65 (1969); Alison Reppy, The Slayer’s Bounty—History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 
19 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 229 (1942); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 803 (1993); Carla Spivack, Killers Shouldn’t Inherit from Their Victims—or Should 
They?, 48 GA. L. REV. 145 (2013); F. F. Thomas, Jr., Public Policy as Affecting Property Rights 
Accruing to a Party as a Result of Wrongful Acts, 1 CALIF. L. REV. 397 (1913); John W. Wade, 
Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another—A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 
(1936); L.E.L., Note, Constructive Trusts—Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It?, 
64 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1916).  
33. Langbein, Will Contests, supra note 27, at 2048. 
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where the stakes are higher. Inheritance disputes have started to evolve 
into criminal and quasi-criminal matters.34 This change is occurring on 
three fronts. First, states have passed elder abuse statutes that prohibit 
“financial exploitation,” including acquiring a senior’s assets via “undue 
influence.”35 Second, as in Bendsten’s case, prosecutors are bringing theft 
charges against people who accept transfers from impaired donors—a 
novel crime that we call “estate theft.”36 Third, legislatures have expanded 
their slayer statutes to disinherit not only killers, but anyone who engages 
in verbal, physical, or financial elder abuse (the “abuser” rule).37 
Surprisingly, although these developments upend centuries of settled law, 
“the legal academy has been almost entirely silent on this trend.”38 
This Article explores the advantages and drawbacks of inheritance-
related crimes. On the one hand, it explains that these measures are 
powerful weapons against the scourge of elder abuse. For decades, 
policymakers have sounded the alarm about this rampant, pernicious, and 
underreported form of wrongdoing.39 And recently, a major demographic 
shift has made the issue even more pressing. The U.S. is experiencing a 
“silver tsunami.”40 By 2050, nearly eighty-four million Americans will be 
age sixty-five or over.41 Moreover, this generation has stockpiled a 
staggering $30 trillion in wealth.42 Fear that wrongdoers will target seniors 
 
34. See infra Part II. 
35. See infra section II.A. 
36. See infra section II.B. 
37. See infra section II.C. 
38. Nina A. Kohn, Elder (In)justice: A Critique of the Criminalization of Elder Abuse, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (discussing criminal elder abuse statutes). A few law review articles have 
focused on discrete aspects of the broader criminalization phenomenon that we address in this Article. 
See, e.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, Preying on the Graying: A Statutory Presumption to Prosecute Elder 
Financial Exploitation, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1099, 1105 (2014) (proposing that states presume that 
certain transfers from elders to non-relatives are suspect). Likewise, a handful of student notes have 
advocated for wider adoption of the abuser rule. See Travis Hunt, Comment, Disincentivizing Elder 
Abuse Through Disinheritance: Revamping California Probate Code § 259 and Using It as a Model, 
2014 BYU L. REV. 445, 470; Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights: 
California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails to Build an Effective 
Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 542 (2001). 
39. See LIFESPAN OF GREATER ROCHESTER, INC., WEILL CORNELL MED. CTR. OF CORNELL UNIV. 
& N.Y.C. DEP’T FOR THE AGING, UNDER THE RADAR: NEW YORK STATE ELDER ABUSE 
PREVALENCE STUDY 11–12 (2011), https://ocfs.ny.gov/main/reports/Under%20the%20Radar% 
2005%2012%2011%20final%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WK6-6R8Y]. 
40. Amy Ziettlow & Naomi Cahn, The Honor Commandment: Law, Religion, and the Challenge 
of Elder Care, 30 J.L. & RELIGION 229, 229 (2015). 
41. See JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, VICTORIA A. VELKOFF & HOWARD HOGAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
AN AGING NATION: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p25-1140.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BNQ-PGCB].  
42. See Mark Hall, The Greatest Wealth Transfer in History: What’s Happening and What Are 
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recently prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission to call 
financial elder abuse the “crime of the 21st century.”43 For these reasons, 
financial exploitation statutes, estate theft, and the abuser rule are timely 
and necessary interventions.44 
But on the other hand, the Article argues that the criminalization of 
probate law is partially misguided. First, these new crimes raise unsettled 
constitutional questions. For example, courts disagree about whether 
broad financial exploitation statutes are void for vagueness under the Due 
Process Clause.45 Similarly, the abuser rule coexists uneasily with state 
constitutional provisions that abolish forfeiture and corruption of blood—
ancient British rules that deprived felons and their families of property 
rights.46 Second, inheritance crimes attach draconian punishments to 
conduct that the legal system has long struggled to regulate.47 Indeed, 
because incapacity and undue influence give factfinders so much leeway, 
the risk of error hangs like a thundercloud over criminal inheritance law.48 
Third, probate law and criminal law do not fit neatly together. Inheritance 
law’s goal of furthering a decedent’s intent can clash with criminal law’s 
objective of deterring and punishing harmful conduct.49 
The Article then uses this critique as a springboard to propose reforms. 
For one, it argues that legislatures should narrow their financial 
exploitation statutes to exclude undue influence. Trusts and estates 
scholars have argued that undue influence should be abolished for 
“fail[ing] to meet any standard of clarity, fairness, or predictability that a 
legal doctrine should satisfy.”50 Yet by criminalizing undue influence, 
states have taken this baton and sprinted in the wrong direction. Next, the 
 
the Implications, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markhall/2019/
11/11/the-greatest-wealth-transfer-in-history-whats-happening-and-what-are-the-
implications/#eaac2e64090a [https://perma.cc/3YZX-VFT9]. 
43. STEPHEN DEANE, OFF. OF THE INV. ADVOC., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ELDER FINANCIAL 
EXPLOITATION: WHY IT IS A CONCERN, WHAT REGULATORS ARE DOING ABOUT IT, AND LOOKING 
AHEAD 7 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/elder-financial-exploitation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4M2M-KRLA].  
44. The phenomenon we describe is part of the overcriminalization trend, in which “[e]very year, 
additional crimes, increased punishments, and novel applications of the criminal justice system enter 
U.S. jurisprudence.” Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 703 
(2005). However, we will focus more narrowly on the pros and cons of criminalizing inheritance-
related conduct than on overcriminalization.  
45. See infra section II.A. 
46. See infra section III.C. 
47. See infra sections II.A–B. 
48. See infra section III.A. 
49. See infra section III.C. 
50. Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be Abolished, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 245, 245 (2010). 
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Article claims that the legal system should harmonize probate and 
criminal rules. Some courts have refused to apply civil law when deciding 
whether misconduct rises to the level of an inheritance crime. For 
instance, the Texas appellate court that affirmed McCay’s conviction did 
not care that the probate judge had never found that Bendsten lacked 
capacity or “the boys” exerted undue influence.51 As the appellate court 
saw it, these concepts “are rooted in the civil law and are [only] 
meaningful in probate proceedings.”52 Yet this approach creates the 
potential for someone to be imprisoned for accepting a transfer that is 
actually valid. Finally, the Article explains why jurisdictions should create 
exceptions to the abuser doctrine. By straying from the purpose of the 
slayer rule, the abuser doctrine can be unconstitutional and produce 
outcomes that are inconsistent with the victim’s intent.53 Giving courts the 
discretion to not apply the disinheritance penalty would shave off these 
rough edges. 
At the outset, we must clarify what we mean by “probate” and 
“inheritance” law. Traditionally, most people passed wealth at death 
through wills and “will substitutes” such as revocable inter vivos trusts.54 
But as life expectancies have soared, elders are often delegating financial 
management to caregivers.55 This means that third parties can freely spend 
seniors’ funds under powers of attorney or as joint accountholders.56 
These lifetime transfers fall under the law of gifts and contracts.57 Yet we 
include them in our analysis because they can be a species of estate 
planning and because litigation over them is marred by the worst evidence 
problem.58 Thus, when we refer to “probate” or “inheritance” law, we 
 
51. See McCay v. State, 476 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. App. 2015).  
52. Id.  
53. See infra section III.C. 
54. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1109 (1984) (coining the phrase “will substitutes” to describe revocable trusts, 
life insurance, pensions, and joint accounts).  
55. See infra section II.A. 
56. Cf. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 201 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2006) (enumerating powers of an 
agent to transact on behalf of the principal pursuant to a power of attorney); UNIF. PROB. CODE 
§ 6-205 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (describing the designation of an agent to transact on behalf of 
an accountholder). 
57. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM. L. 
INST. 2003) (distinguishing capacity standard for wills and will substitutes from irrevocable transfers 
and lifetime gifts). 
58. See infra sections II.A–B; c.f. Ben Chen, Elder Financial Abuse: Capacity Law and Economics, 
106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 24–26), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3710237 
[https://perma.cc/B64X-ZNH6] (describing the “the hidden role of inheritance expectations in 
transactional capacity disputes” as the most common motive for asserting a civil action to avoid an 
inter vivos transaction on grounds of financial exploitation). 
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mean the entire sprawling infrastructure that governs the transmission of 
property at or near the owner’s death. 
The Article contains three Parts. Part I sets the stage for our discussion 
of criminal inheritance law by surveying three core principles from the 
realm of probate litigation: mental incapacity, undue influence, and the 
slayer rule. Part II explains how concern about inheritance-related 
wrongdoing has prompted states to give these doctrines a punitive 
makeover. Part III outlines better ways for the legal system to merge 
inheritance law and criminal law. 
I. CIVIL INHERITANCE LAW 
To see why the criminalization of inheritance-related conduct is so 
fraught, we begin with a primer on probate litigation and describe some 
of the unique features of posthumous adjudication. This Part surveys two 
especially tricky types of disputes about estates: contests and the 
slayer doctrine. 
A. Contests 
“Contests”—challenges to the validity of a gift, will, or trust—are a 
fixture in the probate system.59 These lawsuits are usually based on the 
doctrines of mental incapacity or undue influence (or both).60 This section 
describes these rules and why they have provoked sustained debate. 
The first principle in the field of inheritance law is to carry out a 
decedent’s intent.61 Indeed, owners enjoy the virtually unfettered right to 
choose beneficiaries and divide assets among them.62 As the Restatement 
(Third) of Property puts it, courts lack the “general authority to question 
the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about 
how to allocate his or her property.”63 
One way in which the law facilitates this freedom is by refusing to 
enforce gifts, wills, trusts, and other devices that are not true expressions 
 
59. See David Horton & Reid Kress Weisbord, Probate Litigation, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2022) (manuscript at 34), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3805381 
[https://perma.cc/3BPG-UWF8]. 
60. Id. 
61. See, e.g., Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 27, at 491 (“[V]irtually the entire law 
of wills derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in 
death as in life.”).  
62. See, e.g., Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 
YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941) (arguing that courts should generally honor an owner’s wishes about how to 
distribute her property at death).  
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (AM. 
L. INST. 2003). 
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of the decedent’s wishes. For example, a common ground for attacking an 
end-of-life transfer is by alleging that the donor lacked mental capacity.64 
The test for capacity varies with the type of the conveyance.65 The easiest 
hurdle to clear is “testamentary capacity,” which requires that someone 
who creates a will or a revocable trust be able to grasp the bare rudiments 
of estate planning: 
[A] testator [or settlor] must: (1) know the natural objects of her 
bounty; (2) know her obligations to them; (3) know the character 
and value of her estate; and (4) dispose of her estate according to 
her own fixed purpose. Merely being an older person, possessing 
a failing memory, momentary forgetfulness, weakness of mental 
powers or lack of strict coherence in conversation does not render 
one incapable . . . .66 
Conversely, the standard for executing instruments that are not 
unilaterally revocable, such as gifts and contracts, is more demanding.67 
Because these transactions occur during life—rather than after death—an 
owner will personally experience the results of a bad decision. Thus, 
judges insist that a party to a contract know “the nature and consequences 
of the transaction”68 and the giver of a gift appreciate “the effect that the 
gift may have on [her] future financial security . . . and of anyone who 
may be dependent on [her].”69 
One of the biggest obstacles to prevailing on an incapacity claim is 
 
64. See Horton & Weisbord, supra note 59, at 34–35. 
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE. TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM. L. 
INST. 2003) (describing capacity standard for wills, will substitutes, irrevocable transfers, and 
lifetime gifts). 
66. Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455–56 (Ky. 1998) (noting also that “[t]he minimum level 
of mental capacity required to make a will is less than that necessary to make a deed or a contract” 
(citation omitted)); see also Weaver v. Mietkiewicz, No. 10–P–2260, 2012 WL 592849, at *1 (Mass. 
App. Ct. Feb. 24, 2012) (unpublished table decision) (“[T]he standard for executing a will is different 
from and less stringent than the standard for the capacity to execute a contract.”). The majority view 
is revocable trusts also require testamentary capacity, because—like wills—they can be freely 
cancelled or amended during their creator’s life. See Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 200 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc) (“The capacity required to make or amend a revocable trust is the same as that required to 
make a will—‘testamentary capacity.’”); UNIF. TR. CODE § 601 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“The 
capacity required to create, amend, revoke, or add property to a revocable trust . . . is the same as that 
required to make a will.”). But see Whittemore v. Neff, No. 064348, 2001 WL 753802, at *6 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. June 11, 2001) (reasoning that because revocable trusts can be complicated, “a higher 
degree of mental capacity may be required . . . than is required to execute a will”). 
67. See Chen, supra note 58, at 33 (explaining that “American law formally sets a lower threshold 
for testamentary capacity than for capacity to make contracts, irrevocable gifts and other 
lifetime transactions”). 
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 15 (AM. L. INST. 1981).  
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM. L. INST. 
2003). Similarly, “[a] property owner who does not have the capacity to make a gift lacks capacity to 
establish an irrevocable trust.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 11 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2003). 
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temporal. Courts have long assumed “that every person is sane, until the 
contrary is proven.”70 As a result, “the party alleging incapacity [must] 
show such incapacity at the particular time of the transactions being 
challenged.”71 To be sure, evidence from other periods is relevant if it 
sheds light on the owner’s mental state on the day in question.72 But 
because owners whose mental acuity fluctuate are entitled to a 
presumption that they acted during a lucid interval, courts often discount 
non-contemporaneous proof.73 
For example, in van Gorp v. Smith (In re Estate of Mann),74 Hazel 
Mann became unable to care for herself and was placed under a 
conservatorship.75 She exhibited several telltale signs of dementia: she 
“was unclean and smelled of urine,” “did not seem to know how to order 
the right food from a store,” and “described a toy doll as ‘me.’”76 As she 
was declining, she signed a will.77 A jury nullified the document for 
mental incompetence, but a California appellate court reversed.78 As the 
court explained, “[t]he only evidence suggestive of [Mann’s] incapacity 
at the time the will was executed is in fact evidence of her condition at 
other times,” which did not “overcome the presumption that [she] 
was sane.”79 
Another oft-invoked basis for invalidating a wealth transfer is undue 
 
70. Troy Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. McFarland, 187 So. 3d 1112, 1119 (Ala. 2015) (quoting Thomas 
v. Neal, 600 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Ala. 1992)).  
71. Wheeless v. Gelzer, 780 F. Supp. 1373, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (emphasis added).  
72. See, e.g., Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 200 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (“[E]vidence of mental 
unsoundness either before or after execution, which is not too remote, is admissible to prove lack of 
testamentary capacity, as long as the evidence indicates the unsoundness existed at the time the will 
or trust was made.”); In re Estate of Clements, 505 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); In re Estate of 
Nalaschi, 2014 PA Super 73, ¶ 9, 90 A.3d 8, 12–13 (“Evidence of [the owner’s] state of mind may be 
received for a reasonable time before and after execution as reflective of decedent’s testamentary 
capacity.” (quoting In re Agostini’s Estate, 457 A.2d 861, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983))); Rich v. Rich, 
615 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. App. 1980) (“[T]he court may also look to the state of the testator’s mind 
at time other than when he executed his will, if it tends to show the testator’s state of mind at the time 
of the execution.”). 
73. See Goetz v. Roberts (In re Goetz’ Estate), 61 Cal. Rptr. 181, 186 (Ct. App. 1967) (“When one 
has a mental disorder in which there are lucid periods, it is presumed that his will has been made 
during a time of lucidity.”). On the flip side, “[i]f it appears that the testator was insane prior to the 
execution of the will, and that his insanity was of a progressive and permanent type, there is no basis 
for indulging in a presumption that the will was executed during a lucid interval.” Alexander v. Estate 
of Callahan, 132 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).  
74. 229 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1986). 
75. Id. at 227. 
76. Id.   
77. See id. at 228.  
78. See id. at 230–31.  
79. Id.  
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influence.80 This rule “is one of the most bothersome concepts in all of 
law,” because “[i]t cannot be precisely defined.”81 After all, any decision 
to leave assets to someone else is “the result of influence.”82 But 
supposedly, influence crosses the line and becomes “undue” when it 
overcomes the victim’s autonomy so “his action[] is contrary to his true 
desire and free will.”83 The test is highly subjective: 
It is only when the will of the person who becomes a testator is 
coerced into doing that which he or she does not desire to do, that 
it is undue influence. The coercion may of course be of different 
kinds, it may be in the grossest form, such as actual confinement 
or violence, or a person in the last days or hours of life may have 
become so weak and feeble, that a very little pressure will be 
sufficient to bring about the desired result . . . .84 
Undue influence claims are often litigated under a unique burden-
shifting regime. The challenger first tries to establish a presumption of 
undue influence.85 For gifts and contracts, this presumption arises if there 
is a confidential relationship between the parties—such as attorney-client, 
principal-agent, or doctor-patient—and the arrangement favors the 
dominant individual.86 Alternatively, for wills, the brute fact that a trusted 
person reaps a benefit from the instrument does not create a prima facie 
case.87 Instead, the contestant must also point to one or more “suspicious 
 
80. Undue influence dates to the seventeenth century. See HENRY SWINBURNE, A BRIEFE TREATISE 
OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES 283 (1611). 
81. In re Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 39, 52 (Haw. 1999) (quoting JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY 
M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 160 (1995)).  
82. Madoff, supra note 30, at 575. 
83. Howe v. Palmer, 956 N.E.2d 249, 253–54 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011).  
84. Wingrove v. Wingrove (1886) 11 PD 81, 82–83 (UK); cf. Neill v. Brackett, 126 N.E. 93, 94 
(Mass. 1920) (explaining that undue influence in the context of a deed “may be caused by physical 
force, by duress, by threats, or by importunity” or “may arise from persistent and unrelaxing efforts 
in the establishment or maintenance of conditions intolerable to the particular [victim]”). 
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. f 
(AM. L. INST. 2003) (explaining the presumption of undue influence). 
86. See, e.g., Bitler Inv. Venture II, LLC v. Marathon Ashland Petroleum, LLC, 779 F. Supp. 2d 
858, 884 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (“Certain legal and domestic relationships (i.e., attorney-client, guardian-
ward, principal-agent, pastor-parishioner, and parent-child) raise a presumption of trust and 
confidence as to the subordinate and a corresponding influence as to the dominant party on the 
other.”); cf. D’Onofrio v. Mother of God with Eternal Life, 79 N.Y.S.3d 902, 911 (Sup. Ct. 2018) 
(“[R]elationships between individuals and their ‘spiritual advisors’ may involve trust 
and confidence.”).  
87. See, e.g., Hutcheson v. Bibb, 38 So. 754, 754 (Ala. 1905) (“In transactions testamentary in 
character, the mere existence of confidential relations between the testator and the beneficiary under 
the will are not, in and of themselves alone, sufficient to raise the presumption of undue 
influence . . . .”); Moore v. Moore, 429 P.3d 607, 618 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (analyzing why courts 
apply a “more rigorous standard to reverse the usual burden of proving undue influence for wills than 
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circumstances.”88 These red flags can include a testator who was ill or 
mentally diminished, a beneficiary who actively participated in procuring 
the will, and the existence of an “unnatural” bequest.89 If the challenger 
succeeds in raising the presumption, undue influence has been established 
unless the alleged wrongdoer can prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the transfer was voluntary.90 
A parade of scholars has argued that incapacity and undue influence 
are flawed. These critics make three related arguments. First, they assert 
that incapacity (to some degree) and undue influence (to a greater extent) 
do not actually protect testamentary autonomy, but rather seek to keep 
inheritance within families.91 For example, both rules hinge on whether a 
beneficiary is a “natural” recipient of the decedent’s assets.92 The majority 
view is that an “unnatural” bequest is one that flows to a beneficiary “who 
is not related [to the decedent] by blood or marriage.”93 Thus, incapacity 
 
for contracts”); cf. Mullis v. Welch, 815 S.E.2d 282, 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (applying the undue 
influence test for wills to an irrevocable trust). 
88. Kelley v. Johns, 96 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 & cmts. f, h (AM. L. INST. 2003) (offering a 
laundry list of “suspicious circumstances” and taking the position that the wills doctrine of undue 
influence should also extend to gifts and irrevocable trusts).  
89. Youngs v. Hitz (In re Estate of Novak), 458 N.W.2d 221, 226 (Neb. 1990).  
90. See Caraveo v. Perez (In re Estate of Bethurem), 313 P.3d 237, 241 (Nev. 2013); cf. In re Estate 
of Gaaskjolen, 2020 SD 17, ¶ 23, 941 N.W.2d 808, 815 (describing the beneficiary’s “burden to 
produce evidence that she ‘took no unfair advantage of the decedent’” (quoting In re Estate of 
Dokken, 2000 SD 9, ¶ 28, 604 N.W.2d 487, 495)). Other jurisdictions only require the beneficiary to 
rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. See Smith v. Smith (In re Estate of Smith), 
2020 Ark. App. 113, at 20–21, 597 S.W.3d 65, 77. 
91. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236–
37 (1996) (describing how triers of fact use the capaciousness of incapacity and undue influence “to 
frustrate the testator’s intent and distribute estate assets to family members”); Foster, supra note 31, 
at 210 (explaining that “judges and juries manipulate mental capacity doctrines such as ‘undue 
influence’ and ‘insane delusion’ to reach results more in accord with the family paradigm”); Madoff, 
supra note 30, at 577 (asserting that undue influence does not “protect the intent of the testator, but 
rather to protect the testator’s biological family from disinheritance”).  
92. See, e.g., M. C. Slough, Testamentary Capacity: Evidentiary Aspects, 36 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 
(1957) (“When a testator passes over the natural objects of his bounty in favor of an outsider, it is not 
uncommon for courts to characterize his action as harsh or unnatural or irrational, treating it as 
corroborative evidence of lack of testimentary [sic] capacity.”); Suagee v. Cook (In re Estate of 
Maheras), 897 P.2d 268, 272 (Okla. 1995) (asking “[w]hether the person charged with undue 
influence was not a natural object of the maker’s bounty” (emphasis in original)).  
93. Ingersoll v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll Trust), 950 A.2d 672, 698 (D.C. 2008); see also Sutton v. 
Combs, 419 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Ky. 1967) (“It is natural that a person recognizes his relatives as the 
objects of his bounty unless there is some reason not to do so.”); Hanson v. Vanniewaal (In re Estate 
of Hock), 322 S.W.3d 574, 583 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“[A]n ‘unnatural disposition of property’ may 
be based on evidence of a transfer of property without apparent reason, to non-blood heirs[,] excluding 
the natural objects of one’s bounty.”); Barber v. Pound (In re Estate of Strozzi), 903 P.2d 852, 857 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (“The natural objects of [the testator’s] bounty are . . . those persons designated 
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and undue influence are especially likely to invalidate transfers to friends, 
lovers, same-sex partners, and caregivers.94 
Second, academics have shown that the elasticity of incapacity and 
undue influence allows factfinders to resolve disputes according to their 
own biases.95 Several ignoble cases from the mid-twentieth century bear 
this out. The most infamous example is likely the Supreme Court of New 
York, Appellate Division’s 1964 decision in Weiss v. Kaufmann (In re 
Will of Kaufmann).96 Robert Kaufmann, an heir to the Kay Jewelry 
franchise, left his estate to his lover, Walter Weiss, instead of his 
brothers.97 Robert enclosed a letter with his will thanking Walter for 
fostering his interest in art, giving him “a balanced, healthy sex life” and 
making him happy “after so many wasted, dark, groping, fumbling 
immature years.”98 Upholding a jury verdict of undue influence, the court 
described the letter as “utterly unreal, highly exaggerated and pitched to a 
state of fervor and ecstasy.”99 Opinions like Kaufmann elucidate that some 
undue influence cases are not about “whether the document represented 
the testator’s intent, but whether the testator’s intentions offended the 
 
to inherit from him in the absence of a will.”). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2003) (declaring that “natural” recipients 
of a decedent’s property can be as varied as close family members, stepchildren, and unmarried 
partners); Winston v. Gibbs (In re Estate of Sarabia), 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 564 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
that the “unnatural bequest” element requires an examination of “the respective relative standings of 
the beneficiary and the contestant to the decedent in order . . . [to] determine which party would be 
the more obvious object of the decedent’s testamentary disposition”). 
94. See, e.g., Snyder v. Erwin, 79 A. 124, 124–25 (Pa. 1911) (holding that the testator’s “unlawful 
relation” with beneficiary and “exclusion of an only daughter . . . was evidence of an undue influence 
exerted by the proponent affecting the dispositions of the will, and sufficient in itself to carry the case 
to the jury”); Leslie, supra note 91, at 245 (observing that when testators left property to non-relatives, 
courts “often emphasize the beneficiary’s inability to explain the ‘unnatural’ nature of the bequest”).  
95. See, e.g., Burkhalter v. Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d 93, 105 (Iowa 2013) (“[B]ecause of its spongy 
character, it has been argued the law of undue influence may undermine testamentary freedom in 
order to promote social goals thought to be desirable.”); Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts 
Resulting from Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 200, 201 (1989) (arguing that undue influence “often functions instead as a barometer 
of society’s mores”); Kurt Wanless, Comment, Rethinking Oregon’s Law of Undue Influence in Will 
Contests, 76 OR. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1997) (asserting that undue influence “provides a mechanism 
for judges and juries to rewrite wills to conform with their subjective senses of fair disposition”); cf. 
Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford, “Sufficient” Capacity: The Contrasting Capacity 
Requirements for Different Documents, 2 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L.J. 303, 309 (2006) (noting that “[t]he 
inherent vagueness of the testamentary capacity requirement leaves much of the determination of 
capacity in the hands of the fact-finder”). 
96. 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965).  
97. See id. at 671, 673.  
98. Id. at 671. 
99. Id. at 674; see also Holland v. Traylor (In re Will of Moses), 227 So. 2d 829, 833 (Miss. 1969) 
(striking down a bequest made by a tough, free-spirited businesswoman to her younger lover and 
remarking that she “entertained the pathetic hope that he might marry her”).  
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[trier of fact’s] sense of justice or morality.”100 
Third, academics have challenged undue influence’s psychological 
underpinnings. To them, it is naïve to conceptualize the mind as a kind of 
airplane that can be hijacked. As Carla Spivack puts it, undue influence 
reflects eighteenth century ideas “of the self as impermeable from 
without, ‘free and indivisible,’ and having its own distinct ‘will’ separable 
from that of others.”101 Today, we understand that people are ambivalent, 
that relationships ebb and flow, and that intentions are rarely fixed and 
determinate.102 Therefore, by inquiring whether a decedent’s “free agency 
was destroyed” and “h[er] volition was substituted for that of another,” 
courts ask an unanswerable question.103 
To summarize, contests have long been one of civil law’s problem 
children. As we discuss next, another key probate rule—the slayer 
doctrine—has fared no better. 
B. The Slayer Rule 
The slayer doctrine bars someone from inheriting from the estate of a 
person whose death they caused.104 This section describes the history of 
the rule and why it stands on shaky constitutional footing. 
Understanding the slayer principle begins with the ancient concept of 
attainder. For centuries, the English common law deemed convicted 
felons to be “attainted.”105 This term comes from the Latin word attinctus, 
which means “stained or polluted.”106 Being branded with this scarlet 
mark triggered harsh consequences, called “incidents,” which placed the 
attainted person in a state of “civil death.”107 
 
100. Leslie, supra note 91, at 246. The “family favoritism” critique is linked to the “morality” 
critique because courts and juries often believe that it is somehow wrongful not to provide for one’s 
family. See, e.g., Madoff, supra note 30, at 576 (contending that “the undue influence doctrine denies 
freedom of testation for people who deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms—in 
particular, the norm that people should provide for their families”).  
101. Spivack, supra note 50, at 271. 
102. See id. (criticizing the antiquated idea that there is “a stable, independent self with firm and 
discernible boundaries between itself and others”); Madoff, supra note 30, at 622 (observing that 
undue influence depends on the faulty premises that “a person’s natural state is one of independence 
from others” and “for people who are dependent on other people, it is possible to determine what their 
intentions would be if they were not dependent”).  
103. Melcher v. Benson (In re Estate of McLean), 2004 WY 126, ¶ 11, 99 P.3d 999, 1004 
(Wyo. 2004). 
104. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 
(AM. L. INST. 2003) (restating the slayer rule). 
105. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
476 (2d ed. 1909).  
106. 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 499 (1819) (emphasis omitted).  
107. Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888).   
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Two incidents of attainder are especially important for our purposes. 
First, under the forfeiture doctrine, attainted individuals surrendered their 
property to the Crown or to their lord.108 Second, the legal system deemed 
the blood of felons to be “corrupt,” which meant that they could neither 
inherit assets nor transmit them at death.109 This double-barreled penalty 
was devastating: 
[A]ll the property of one attained, real and personal, is forfeited; 
his blood is corrupted, so that nothing can pass by inheritance to, 
from, or through him; . . . and thus, his wife, children, and 
collateral relations suffering with him, the tree, falling, comes 
down with all its branches.110 
Nevertheless, as Blackstone explained, these tenets reflected the 
prevailing belief that ownership was a privilege that the monarchy could 
freely revoke.111 
In America, the founding generation rejected these harsh rules.112 In 
their eyes, the forfeiture rule’s disregard for the sanctity of private 
property smacked of feudalism.113 But the legal intelligentsia at the time 
were especially appalled by corruption of blood. James Madison 
 
108. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 381–84 (12th ed. 
1793) (explaining that attainder resulted in “forfeit[ure] to the king all the lands and tenements”). The 
Crown had the right to seize the felon’s real property, and if it did not exercise this prerogative, the 
land would escheat to the lord. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 351. This was 
consistent with the prevailing norm that criminal justice “was a profitable source of revenue” for the 
monarchy. F. W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 10 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. 
Whittaker eds., 1936).  
109. See Lord de la Warre’s Case (1597) 77 Eng. Rep. 1145, 1146; 11. Co. Rep. 1 a, 1 b (explaining 
that “where one is attainted of treason and felony,” one suffers “absolute and perpetual disability by 
corruption of blood for any of his posterity to claim any inheritance in fee-simple”); Trs. of Dartmouth 
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 607 (1819) (“In England, . . . corruption of blood, and 
consequent forfeiture of the entire property of the criminal, [w]as the regular and inevitable 
consequences of a capital conviction at common law.”). 
110. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 967, at 716 (John M. Zane & Carl 
Zollmann eds., 9th ed. 1923). 
111. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 299 (12th ed. 1793) 
(opining that because “all property is derived from society,” a felon “violates the fundamental contract 
of his association”).  
112. The Framers were particularly concerned about the British practice of using of bills of 
attainder: legislation that imposes criminal penalties on specific people without a judicial trial. See 
Charles H. Wilson, Jr., Comment, The Supreme Court’s Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for 
Clarification, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 212, 213–15 (1966) (describing how bills of attainder “were designed 
to remove a political enemy before he became powerful enough to pose a real threat to the King or to 
Parliament”). Thus, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution expressly abolishes “Bill[s] 
of Attainder.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. In addition, Article III, Section 3, Clause 2 declares that 
“[t]he Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason 
shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. Id. art. III, 
§ 3, cl. 2. 
113. See Reppy, supra note 32, at 233–34 (describing forfeiture’s feudal origins).  
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described this ruthless principle as “extending the consequences of guilt 
beyond the person of its author.”114 Likewise, Joseph Story argued that 
the doctrine had the potential to lead a felon’s innocent family to “poverty 
and ruin.”115 Thus, both the federal Crimes Act of 1790 and nearly every 
state constitution declares that “no conviction . . . shall work corruption 
of blood, or forfeiture of any estate.”116 
This seismic shift in criminal law revealed a gap in the field of wills 
and trusts. With surprising frequency, a murderer was either an intestate 
heir of the decedent or a beneficiary under the decedent’s will.117 Could 
the killer receive the victim’s property? This issue had never arisen in the 
era of forfeiture and corruption of blood, because perpetrators 
relinquished their assets and their ability to participate in the inheritance 
process.118 But now that these rules were defunct, there was no authority 
on point. 
Until the late nineteenth century, most courts allowed killers to take 
from their victims’ estates.119 These decisions rested on two pillars. The 
first was judicial modesty. Statutes in every state require courts to enforce 
duly executed wills and to distribute an intestate decedent’s property to 
specific heirs.120 Because, in the nineteenth century, these laws did not 
exempt slayers, judges held that they could not create such an exclusion 
 
114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 221 (James Madison) (John Dunn et al. eds., 2009). 
115. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1295, at 
172 (1833).  
116. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117; see ALA. CONST. art. I, § 19; ALASKA 
CONST. art I, § 15; ARIZ. CONST. art 2, § 16; COLO. CONST. art II, § 9; CONN. CONST. art. IX, § 4; 
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 15; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XX; ILL. CONST. art. I, 
§ 11; IND. CONST. art. I, § 30; KAN. CONST. § 12; KY. CONST. § 20; ME. CONST. art I, § 11; MD. 
CONST. art. 27; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 11; MO. CONST. art. I, § 30; MONT. 
CONST. art. II, § 30; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.C. CONST. art I, § 29; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 12; OKLA. 
CONST. art. II, § 15; OR. CONST. art. I, § 25; PA. CONST. art I, §§ 18–19; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4; TENN. 
CONST. art. I, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 21; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 18; 
WIS. CONST. art I, § 12. Other states passed similar statutes. HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-3 (2020); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:3 (2020); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-4 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 55.1-103 
(2020).  
117. See Ames, supra note 32, at 226 (noting that “[b]y a strange chance there have been seven of 
these cases reported in the last nine years”). 
118. See Reppy, supra note 32, at 230 (attributing “[t]he absence of early English decisions on this 
problem” to incidents of attainder). 
119. See Shellenberger v. Ransom, 59 N.W. 935, 941 (Neb. 1894); Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794, 
795 (N.C. 1888); Deem v. Millikin, 6 Ohio C.C. 357 (Cir. Ct. May 1892), aff’d sub nom. Deem v. 
Milliken, 44 N.E. 1134 (Ohio 1895); In re Carpenter’s Estate, 32 A. 637, 639 (Pa. 1895). But see N.Y. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (refusing to allow the beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy to recover when he had feloniously killed the insured). 
120. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-101(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“Upon the death of a person, 
[the person’s] real and personal property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by [the 
person’s] last will . . . or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to [the person’s] heirs . . . .”). 
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out of whole cloth.121 Second, courts opined that their jurisdiction’s 
constitutional prohibition on incidents of attainder prevented them from 
disqualifying slayers.122 For example, in In re Carpenter’s Estate,123 an 
1895 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, a son murdered his father 
“for the purpose of securing [his father’s] property” in intestacy.124 The 
court allowed the son to inherit, declaring: “The penalty for murder in the 
first degree . . . is death by hanging. No confiscation of lands or goods, 
and no deprivation of the inheritable quality of blood, constitutes any part 
of the penalty of this offense.”125 
But gradually, the tide began to turn. The catalyst for this change was 
the New York Court of Appeals’ celebrated decision in Riggs v. 
Palmer.126 Francis Palmer executed a will that left most of his estate to his 
sixteen-year-old grandson, Elmer Palmer.127 Later, Elmer learned that 
Francis was considering revoking the instrument.128 Before Francis could 
do so, Elmer poisoned him.129 After Elmer was convicted of murder, 
Francis’s daughters filed an action to disinherit him.130 The state justices 
admitted that the probate code, if “literally construed,” required them to 
uphold Francis’s will as written.131 Nevertheless, the Court held that 
lawmakers simply could not have intended “a donee who murdered the 
testator to make the will operative [to] have any benefit under it.”132 Thus, 
the Court erased Elmer from Francis’s will to avoid the perverse result of 
a slayer “acquir[ing] property by his own crime.”133 After Riggs, every 
American jurisdiction adopted some version of the slayer rule.134 
 
121. See Shellenberger, 59 N.W. at 939 (“In our statute of descent there is neither ambiguity, nor 
room for construction.”); Owens, 6 S.E. at 795; Deem, 6 Ohio C.C. 357; In re Carpenter’s Estate, 32 
A. at 637.  
122. See Owens, 6 S.E. at 795 (“Forfeitures of property for crime are unknown to our law . . . .”); 
Deem, 6 Ohio C.C. 357 (“[A] legislative body, careful to respect both the letter and the spirit of the 
constitution, should hesitate to attach to felonies any of the consequences of the corruption of blood.”).  
123. 32 A. 637 (Pa. 1895). 
124. Id. at 639 (Williams, J., concurring).  
125. Id. at 637 (majority opinion).  
126. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
127. Id. at 188–89. 
128. Id. at 189. 
129. Id.  
130. See id. at 188, 191.  
131. See id. at 189. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 190.  
134. Most jurisdictions have adopted the slayer rule by statute. E.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-253 (2020); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204 (West 2020); CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 15-11-803 (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-447 (2020); D.C. CODE § 19-320 (2020); FLA. STAT. 
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In most states, the slayer doctrine now bars a person from receiving 
property via intestacy, will, trust, or nonprobate transfer from someone 
whom the slayer intentionally and feloniously kills.135 As such, the slayer 
rule furthers the goals of both inheritance and criminal law. For starters, 
it carries out a decedent’s presumed intent.136 Indeed, slayers cannot 
inherit because “the victim would not want his murderer to receive the 
legacy.”137 At the same time, in a nod to criminal law, the doctrine also 
disincentives illegal behavior by ensuring that “no one [is] allowed to 
profit by his own wrong.”138 
Yet lurking beneath this intuitive doctrine are several mind-bending 
complexities. For example, the relationship between criminal trials and 
petitions to disqualify a slayer in probate court can be confusing. 
Prosecutors must prove criminal liability by the most onerous standard in 
 
§ 732.802 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-803 (2020); 755 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/2-6 (2020); IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12.1 (2020); IOWA CODE § 633.535 (2020); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 265, § 46 (2020); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-803 (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2354 (2020); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-803 (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 31-1-106 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803 (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2500-01 
(2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.010 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2 (2020). In addition, a handful 
of states apply the slayer rule as a matter of common law, often using the equitable remedy of a 
constructive trust to transmit the victim’s property to the rightful recipients. E.g., Wright v. Wright, 
449 S.W.2d 952, 953–54 (Ark. 1970); Welch v. Welch, 252 A.2d 131, 133–34 (Del. Ch. 1969); Perry 
v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 1908); In re Estate of Bach, 383 N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (App. 
Div. 1976); Hargrove v. Taylor, 389 P.2d 36, 37 (Or. 1964); Thompson v. Mayes, 707 S.W.2d 951, 
955 (Tex. App. 1986).   
135. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (“A person who feloniously and intentionally kills the 
decedent is not entitled to . . . [a]ny property, interest, or benefit under a will of the decedent, 
or . . . [a]ny property of the decedent by intestate succession.”). 
136. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 32, at 861 (“[I]f A, a legatee under B’s will, murders B, A is 
barred from inheriting not because A has done something bad—the badness will, after all, be 
addressed by the criminal law—but because we can infer with confidence that B would have wanted 
A disinherited.” (emphasis in original)); Stephanie J. Willbanks, Does It Pay to Kill Your Mother? 
The Effect of a Criminal Acquittal in a Subsequent Civil Proceeding to Disqualify the Slayer, 16 
CONN. L. REV. 29, 50 (1983) (“[D]isqualification statutes merely attempt to accomplish what the 
decedent would have done had he known the true state of affairs.”). But see Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom 
of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2214 (2011) (observing that slayer 
statutes do not contain exceptions for decedents who forgive their murderers before dying or assisted 
suicide and concluding that “intent makes no difference” (emphasis omitted)).  
137. Note, Constructive Trust Theory as Applied to Property Acquired by Crime, 30 HARV. L. REV. 
622, 624 (1917); Chadwick, supra note 32, at 212 (“[T]here is a presumption . . . that the testator 
would have revoked the bequest . . . .”).  
138. Wade, supra note 32, at 715; Strawbridge, 108 S.W. at 642 (“Can it be said that one, by high-
handed murder, can not only make himself an heir in fact, when he had but a mere expectancy before, 
but further shall enjoy the fruits of his own crime?”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2011) (“The transparent purpose of the slayer rule is 
to prevent unjust enrichment by homicide.”).  
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law: beyond a reasonable doubt.139 As a result, someone who has been 
convicted of an intentional and felonious killing and exhausted their 
appellate rights is barred from inheriting.140 But on the flip side, an 
acquittal in the criminal matter means nothing in probate.141 Indeed, the 
same evidence may fail to establish guilt but also satisfy the probate judge 
that the accused more likely than not committed the crime.142 For instance, 
in Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez,143 an Arizona appellate court found that 
a murder victim’s widow was his “slayer” even though the police 
determined that they did not even have probable cause to arrest her.144 
In addition, courts had to rationalize the slayer rule in the face of state 
constitutional provisions that abolish incidents of attainder. A handful of 
opinions have strongly implied—albeit never held—that the slayer 
doctrine improperly allows “forfeiture of property rights [to] follow 
conviction for crime.”145 However, these decisions, which predate the 
widespread adoption of slayer statutes, merely cite the forfeiture doctrine 
as a reason not to create a common law slayer rule.146 Thus, they punch 
with little weight today. 
Conversely, the overwhelming majority of opinions have rejected 
 
139. See, e.g., Wiley v. State, No. 989, 2020 WL 241523, at *5 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 15, 
2020) (“Viewing various burdens of proof as a continuation running from the highest to the lowest, 
the most demanding burden would be ‘beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .’”).   
140. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12.1(a) (2020) (“A judgment of conviction is conclusive in a 
subsequent civil action . . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-803(f) (2020) (same); Sulser v. Winnick, 
No. CV074027013, 2007 WL 2390676, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007) (holding that a criminal 
conviction is dispositive in a later probate proceeding “where all rights of appeal have been exhausted 
or the time for appeal has expired”).  
141. See, e.g., Hoss v. Hoge (In re Estate of Kissinger), 166 Wash. 2d 120, 128, 206 P.3d 665, 669 
(2009) (“No jurisdiction treats an acquittal as conclusive evidence of the lawfulness of the killing.”). 
142. See, e.g., Webb v. McDaniel, 127 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Ga. 1962) (“[A] finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had with malice aforethought killed his wife and 
thereby forfeited his right of inheritance would be wholly consistent with the finding that the [s]tate 
had failed to prove [the same facts] beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(g) 
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“In the absence of a conviction, the court . . . must determine whether, 
under the preponderance of evidence standard, the individual would be found criminally accountable 
for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent.”).  
143. 213 P.3d 197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).  
144. Id. at 203.  
145. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 106 N.E. 785, 790 (Ill. 1914) (quoting Collins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
83 N.E. 542, 543 (Ill. 1907)); see also Hagan v. Cone, 94 S.E. 602, 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 1917); Wilson 
v. Randolph, 261 P. 654, 655 (Nev. 1927). 
146. See, e.g., Wall, 106 N.E. at 790 (“If other punishment be required, the duty to so provide rests 
upon the legislative branch of the government.”); Wilson, 261 P. at 655 (“The right of inheritance is 
a civil right existing by virtue of law, and the Legislature has not provided that any of those facts shall 
deprive one of such right of inheritance.”).  
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forfeiture challenges.147 Many of these cases invoke what is known as the 
“owned interest” rationale.148 This view relies on the fact that, when a 
property owner is still alive, third parties usually have no stake in the 
owner’s property. An owner who is intestate can always create an estate 
plan, and a testator or settlor who has executed a will or a revocable trust 
can amend or cancel the instrument.149 Technically, then, the slayer rule 
does not force a criminal to disgorge the slayer’s property.150 Indeed, at 
the time of the murder, the slayer has a mere expectancy, not a “vested 
interest . . . upon which the constitutional prohibition against forfeiture 
could operate.”151 As Maryland’s highest court succinctly put it, “[o]ne 
cannot forfeit what [one] never had.”152  Thus, the common principle 
underpinning all of these cases is that the slayer rules do not violate state 
constitutional prohibitions on forfeiture because they do not disgorge any 
vested property interest belonging to the slayer. 
Yet the owned interest rationale only goes so far. Courts developed the 
theory in the early twentieth century, when intestacies and wills were 
common.153 Starting in the 1960s, the nonprobate revolution muddied the 
waters.154 Owners began to use devices like trusts and joint accounts to 
 
147. See Moore v. Moore, 168 S.E.2d 318, 320 (Ga. 1969); Helwinkel v. Helwinkel (In re 
Helwinkel’s Estate), 18 Cal. Rptr. 473, 475–76 (Ct. App. 1962); Legette v. Smith, 85 S.E.2d 576, 580 
(S.C. 1955); Weaver v. Hollis, 22 So. 2d 525, 529 (Ala. 1945). 
148. Fellows, supra note 32, at 540. 
149. See, e.g., Wass v. Hammontree, 77 S.W.2d 1006, 1010 (Mo. 1934) (“[N]o one is an heir to 
the living . . . .”).  
150. See, e.g., Bell ex rel. Bell v. Casper ex rel. Church, 717 S.E.2d 783, 788 (Va. 2011) (reasoning 
that the slayer statute “does not work a corruption of blood because it does not deprive a ‘slayer’s’ 
heirs the right to inherit from the ‘slayer’ property properly belonging to the ‘slayer’” (emphasis 
omitted)); Lore v. Habermeyer (In re King’s Estate), 52 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Wis. 1952) (“As to 
attainder, there is none because in our view of the law the estate never vested in [the slayer].”).  
151. Moore, 168 S.E.2d at 320; Blodgett v. Blodgett (In re Estate of Blodgett), 147 P.3d 702, 710 
(Alaska 2006) (“By killing the decedent, the slayer prevents the property interest from vesting in 
himself.”); Weaver, 22 So. 2d at 529 (“The exclusion of the murderer from the property benefit does 
not inflict upon him any greater or other punishment for his crime than the law specifies, and takes 
no property from him, but simply bars him from acquiring property by his crime . . . .”); In re 
Helwinkel, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 476 (“To hold that appellant cannot profit by murder is not to invoke a 
forfeiture, as she had no right to the [property] in the first instance.”); Box v. Lanier, 79 S.W. 1042, 
1047 (Tenn. 1904) (“[T]he surviving husband never acquired an estate in this property, and therefore 
there was nothing upon which this constitutional provision could operate.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF RESTITUTION § 187 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1937) (“[T]he murderer is not deprived of property 
lawfully acquired by him, but is merely prevented from acquiring . . . property through his 
unlawful act.”). 
152. Price v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470, 471 (Md. 1933); Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 
1908) (reasoning that when the slayer doctrine disinherits a killer, it “takes nothing from [her], but 
simply says, ‘you cannot acquire property in this way’”).  
153. See Langbein, supra note 54, at 1108 (describing the decline in probate-based wealth transfer, 
such as wills, and the rise of trusts, life insurance, and pay-on-death accounts).  
154. See id.  
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bypass the unpopular probate system.155 In turn, this meant that the slayer 
rule began to apply to assets that had already passed to the slayer. For 
instance, the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust are “vested with the 
equitable ownership of . . . the property.”156 Likewise, if the victim and 
the slayer hold title in joint tenancy, they each possess “a present interest 
rather than a future expectancy.”157 Courts began to recognize that when 
the slayer rule divests the killer of one of these rights or items, it actually 
does “work a forfeiture” by depriving slayers of a “property interest which 
[they] had at the instant before the slaying.”158 
Modern authority has tried to plug the holes in the owned interest 
rationale with an account that this Article calls the “murder profiteering” 
theory. This perspective argues that the forfeiture doctrine was 
objectionable because it meted out “punishment based solely on an 
individual’s criminal status as a convicted felon.”159 But the slayer rule 
does not penalize for the sake of penalizing. Instead, it also serves a 
second purpose: preventing unjust enrichment by vindicating “the 
accepted policy that a killer should not profit from his wrong.”160 Thus, 
under the murder profiteering view, the slayer doctrine does not 
impermissibly punish a criminal because slayers are criminals; rather, it 
simply strips killers of the fruits of their crime.161 
In addition, corruption of blood challenges to the slayer rule have been 
 
155. See id.  
156. Taylor v. Bunnell, 23 P.2d 1062, 1063 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).   
157. Wieser v. Heinol, 2014 IL App (1st) 132859-U, ¶ 7 (unpublished opinion). 
158. Johansen v. Pelton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789 (Ct. App. 1970) (emphasis added); Snortland v. 
Mercer (In re Estate of Snortland), 311 N.W.2d 36, 38 n.1 (N.D. 1981); Shields v. Shields (In re 
Estate of Shields), 574 P.2d 229, 233 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977), aff’d, 584 P.2d 139 (Kan. 1978); Wade, 
supra note 32, at 728 (observing that a slayer rule that deprived the killer of her share of property held 
in joint tenancy would be problematic because “the slayer already has a property interest, of which 
he cannot constitutionally be deprived by the statute”); cf. Neiman v. Hurff, 93 A.2d 345, 347–48 
(N.J. 1952) (acknowledging that divesting a slayer of his interest in corporate stock held in joint 
tenancy would be an unconstitutional forfeiture, but imposing a constructive trust on the killer that 
required him to pay income from the stock to the victim’s beneficiaries). 
159. Robert F. Hennessy, Property—The Limits of Equity: Forfeiture, Double Jeopardy, and the 
Massachusetts “Slayer Statute,” 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 197 (2009) (emphasis added).  
160. Blodgett v. Blodgett (In re Estate of Blodgett), 147 P.3d 702, 710 (Alaska 2006) (“[A]ny loss 
caused by a slayer statute is not improperly based on attainders or on the legal status of a felon; rather, 
the slayer statute exists to effectuate the accepted policy that a killer should not profit from his 
wrong.”); Nat’l City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d 710, 716 (Ind. 1957) (“These 
statutes . . . merely prevent the murderer from profiting by his act.”); Fellows, supra note 32, at 544. 
161. See Fellows, supra note 32, at 544 (“The constitutional prohibitions against forfeiture of estate 
and corruption of blood were designed to restrict punishment based on the criminal status, leaving the 
state free to impose forfeitures that have a nexus to the criminal act.”).  
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less common but more successful than forfeiture challenges.162 These 
claims are usually brought by the slayer’s children.163 As a result, they 
operate in tandem with the doctrines of lapse and antilapse. The rule of 
lapse holds that a beneficiary must survive the decedent to inherit from 
the decedent’s estate.164 Slayer rules absorb this concept by treating the 
killer as having “predeceased the [victim],” which, in turn, causes any 
devise from the victim to the slayer to lapse.165 Antilapse, however, 
tempers the rule of lapse when a predeceased beneficiary is closely related 
to the testator, in which case, the share that would have passed to the 
predeceased beneficiary is instead reallocated to that relative’s own 
descendants.166 Some jurisdictions extend antilapse to slayers and thus 
allow the slayer’s kids or grandkids to inherit the slayer’s share of the 
victim’s estate.167 For example, as a Kentucky judge reasoned while 
refusing to penalize the slayer’s four-year-old daughter: 
I cannot believe that it was the intention of the [l]egislature . . . to 
deny the right to inherit the estate to an innocent child, even 
though the child is a daughter of the person who committed the 
murder. To so hold in this case is to punish a baby who could not 
have counseled, advised or influenced her father in the 
commission of his crime, and takes from her the inheritance to 
which she is . . . entitled.168 
 
162. Compare supra text accompanying notes 147–152, with infra text accompanying notes 168, 
171–176.  
163. See infra text accompanying note 168, 171–176.  
164. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.2 
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“[A]n individual who fails to survive the decedent cannot take 
as . . . a devisee.”). 
165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2322 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-803 (2020); IOWA CODE 
§ 633.535 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-4 (2019); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-4 (2020); 20 PA. 
CONS. STAT. §§ 8803–04 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2502 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 11.84.030 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2(a) (2020); In re Estate of Van Der Veen, 935 P.2d 1042, 
1046 (Kan. 1997). 
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 (AM. L. 
INST. 2003). 
167. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2502 (“[T]he antilapse provisions . . . are applicable . . . .”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 2003) 
(calling for antilapse to apply). 
168. Bates v. Wilson, 232 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Ky. 1950). Although Bates v. Wilson is unclear, it 
appears to have presented the question of whether the slayer’s daughter could inherit through her 
murderous father in intestacy. 232 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1950). That issue is similar—but not identical—
to antilapse, because it involves interpreting the statute of descent and distribution, rather than 
antilapse legislation. As with antilapse, not every court is willing to allow the slayer’s children to 
inherit through the slayer in intestacy. The problem is that the slayer is still alive, and intestacy statutes 
prohibit an heir from taking property through a living parent. See Cook v. Grierson, 845 A.2d 1231, 
1235 (Md. 2004) (“While [the slayer] is prohibited from inheriting from his father because of his act 
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But many states exempt slayers from antilapse.169 Lawmakers and courts 
in this camp reason that the slayer’s descendants should not inherit 
because their benefit flows just as inexorably from the crime as the 
slayer’s benefit.170 
Slayers’ children sometime argue that antilapse is required to avoid 
resurrecting the harsh doctrine of corruption of blood. For instance, in 
Misenheimer v. Misenheimer,171 Isam Misenheimer executed a will that 
left the residue of his estate to his eight kids equally, including his son 
John.172 John then murdered Isam.173 Because John had two sons of his 
own, the North Carolina Supreme Court had to decide whether to apply 
antilapse and give John’s share of the estate to his children or to allow 
Isam’s remaining seven kids to absorb John’s share.174 The justices ruled 
in favor of John’s sons, remarking that “[w]hile it may be true that ‘the 
gods visit the sins of the fathers upon the children,’ . . . [we] will not do 
so.”175 Then, in a long footnote, the Court opined that reaching the 
opposite conclusion “would render the slayer statute unconstitutional as 
applied” by disinheriting John’s sons “because of their father’s 
corrupt blood.”176 
To conclude, there is tension between the slayer doctrine and state 
constitutional prohibitions on forfeiture laws and the corruption of blood 
doctrine. Although courts have mostly rejected forfeiture challenges, they 
have done so for reasons that are anachronistic. Also, judges seem to be 
more receptive to the fine-grained claim that failing to apply antilapse 
contravenes the proscription on corruption of blood. 
*   *   * 
Inheritance litigation has long vexed the civil justice system. The 
 
of patricide, he is, nevertheless, still living. Consequently, the grandchildren are not ‘issue’ within the 
meaning of the intestacy statute.”). 
169. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 2021); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-4 (“The slayer shall be 
deemed to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed to the slayer by 
devise or legacy from the decedent, except that the provisions of [antilapse] shall not apply.”); 
McGhee v. Banks, 154 S.E.2d 37, 40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that antilapse does not apply 
to slayers). 
170. See Wade, supra note 32, at 727 (“[T]he heirs or next of kin of the slayer may claim the 
property if they are entitled to it in their own right, but they cannot claim through an ancestor who 
has disqualified himself by his wrong.”).  
171. 325 S.E.2d 195 (N.C. 1985). 
172. Id. at 196. 
173. Id. 
174. See id. at 197.  
175. Id. at 198 (citations omitted) (quoting EURIPIDES, PHRIXUS).  
176. Id. at 198–99 n.2. But see Bell ex rel. Bell v. Casper ex rel. Church, 717 S.E.2d 783, 788 (Va. 
2011) (applying both the owned interest and murder profiteering theories to reject a corruption of 
blood challenge).   
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doctrines of mental incapacity and undue influence suffer from the worst 
evidence problem and give factfinders the “latitude to substitute their 
wishes for the testator’s.”177 In addition, state constitutions cast a long 
shadow over the slayer rule. Yet as the next Part explains, these 
challenging principles have strayed beyond their traditional domain in 
probate court and started to infiltrate the field of criminal law. 
II. CRIMINAL INHERITANCE LAW 
The law generally “does not seek to ‘punish and deter’ ordinary private 
wrongs.”178 Traditionally, then, there has been little doubt that 
“[i]nterference with freedom of testation . . . does not constitute a 
crime.”179 However, this Part reveals that states are now creating punitive 
sanctions for conduct that they once regulated solely through probate 
rules. These newly minted doctrines both serve important purposes and 
raise thorny questions. 
A. Financial Exploitation 
Nearly every state has enacted legislation that criminalizes verbally or 
physically assaulting a senior.180 In addition, as this section explains, 
many of these statutes also outlaw the amorphous offense of “financial 
exploitation” through “undue influence.”181 
The seeds of criminal elder abuse statutes were sown in the late 
twentieth century. In 1981, the Select Committee on Aging of the U.S. 
House of Representatives published a report on the little-noticed crisis of 
antisocial conduct directed at seniors.182 After a year-long investigation, 
the Committee reached three sobering conclusions. First, the Committee 
determined that about 4% of seniors suffered moderate or severe 
 
177. Langbein, Will Contests, supra note 27, at 2043.  
178. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 799 (Ct. App. 2003); see also Commonwealth 
v. Drew, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 179, 185 (1837) (“It is not the policy of the law to punish criminally 
mere private wrongs.”). 
179. Eike G. Hosemann, Protecting Freedom of Testation: A Proposal for Law Reform, 47 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 419, 444 (2014). 
180. See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
181. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
182. See SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97TH CONG., ELDER ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF A HIDDEN 
PROBLEM, at III (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT ON ELDER ABUSE]. At the time, 
only a handful of states regulated elder abuse. See id. at 127. In addition, these laws merely required 
health care professionals and law enforcement officials to report suspected abuse. See id.; Lawrence 
R. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse: An Inappropriate, 
Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q. 69, 88 (1982).  
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mistreatment each year.183 Second, the Committee found that the 
perpetrators were often the victim’s friends, family, or caretakers.184 
Third, the Committee discovered that shame and fear often drove elders 
not to report harm.185 For these reasons, the Committee declared that elder 
abuse was “a full-scale national problem which exists with a frequency 
that few have dared to imagine.”186 
Since then, these concerns have intensified. America is undergoing a 
demographic sea change. As baby boomers are becoming senior citizens, 
the U.S. elderly population is skyrocketing. For example, in 1990, thirty-
one million individuals were sixty-five or older.187 By 2012, that number 
had swollen to forty-three million, and by 2050, it will top eighty 
million.188 In turn, as the ranks of the elderly grow, “so too will the 
numbers of new and existing cases of Alzheimer’s [and] dementia.”189 
Because this generation is the wealthiest in history,190 its members are 
inviting targets for scams and manipulation.191 
As a result, most jurisdictions have now passed criminal elder abuse 
schemes.192 Some of these laws safeguard all people above a certain age 
 
183. HOUSE REPORT ON ELDER ABUSE, supra note 182, at XIV. More recent studies show that 
about 10% of elders have experienced some form of abuse. See Ron Acierno, Melba A. Hernandez, 
Ananda B. Amstadter, Heidi S. Resnick, Kenneth Steve, Wendy Muzzy & Dean G. Kilpatrick, 
Prevalence and Correlates of Emotional, Physical, Sexual, and Financial Abuse and Potential 
Neglect in the United States: The National Elder Mistreatment Study, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 292, 
294 (2010).  
184. See HOUSE REPORT ON ELDER ABUSE, supra note 182, at XIV.  
185. See id. at XV.  
186. Id. at XIV. 
187. LISA HETZEL & ANNETTA SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 65 YEARS AND OVER 
POPULATION: 2000, at 1 (2001), https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X4SV-3QW5].  
188. See id. The rising number of seniors is also a product of increased life expectancy. See AMY 
ZIETTLOW & NAOMI CAHN, HOMEWARD BOUND: MODERN FAMILIES, ELDER CARE, AND LOSS 
15 (2017). 
189. ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2019 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 23 (2019), 
https://www.alz.org/media/documents/alzheimers-facts-and-figures-2019-r.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U8EH-TCVM].   
190. See Emily Brandon, 3 Reasons Baby Boomers Are the Richest Generation in History, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 21, 2008, 2:07 PM), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/planning-
to-retire/2008/11/21/3-reasons-baby-boomers-aare-the-richest-generation-in-history (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2021). 
191. See generally Rebecca C. Morgan, Pamela B. Teaster & Randolph W. Thomas, A View from 
the Bridge: A Brief Look at the Progression of Cases of Elder Financial Exploitation Prosecutions, 
25 ELDER L.J. 271, 309–10 (2018) (observing that the aging of baby boomers has increased the 
number of potential victims of elder financial exploitation). 
192. See ALA. CODE § 38-9D-2 (2020); ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.900 (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46-451 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1703 (2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 368 (West 2020); 
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(usually about sixty-five),193 while others also require the victim to be 
vulnerable in some fashion.194 They impose stringent criminal penalties 
on defendants who deliberately cause a member of the protected class to 
experience “physical pain or mental suffering.”195 
Yet many of these statutes go further and criminalize knowingly 
engaging in “financial exploitation.”196 Although states define “financial 
exploitation” differently, all of them employ extremely broad language. 
Georgia’s legislation is typical: 
“[Financial] exploitation” means the illegal or improper use 
of . . . [an elder] person’s resources through undue influence, 
 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-3.1-101 (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-450 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 31, § 3902 (2020); D.C. CODE § 7-1901 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 415.102 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 30-5-3 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 39-5302 (2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-56 (2020); IOWA CODE 
§ 235B.2 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1430 (2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1503 (2020); ME. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 3472 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-604, 8-801 (West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 19A, § 14 (2020); MINN. STAT. § 609.232 (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47-5 (2020); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 192.2400 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-803 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5092 
(2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-407 (West 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-16 (2020); N.Y. SOC. 
SERV. LAW § 473 (McKinney 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-101 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-
25.2-01 (2020); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.§ 5101.60 (West 2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 10-103 
(2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 124.005 (2020); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10225.103 (2020); 42 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 42-66-4.1 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-10 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-102 (2020); 
TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.002 (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-301 (West 2020); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1605 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 74.34.020 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 9-6-1 
(2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-102 (2020). 
193. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6.5-102(2) (2020) (seventy); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3902(7) 
(sixty-two); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 222(9) (2020) (sixty-two); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-3(6) (sixty-
five); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-56(c)(1) (sixty); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5417(e)(3) (2020) (sixty); 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(b)(2) (sixty-eight); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-366.01 (2020) (sixty-
five); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5092(6) (sixty). 
194. See, e.g., IOWA CODE. § 235B.2(4) (noting that the victim must be “unable to protect the 
person’s own interests or unable to adequately perform or obtain services necessary to meet essential 
human needs”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1430(a) (same); MINN. STAT. § 609.232 (protecting people 
who cannot “provide adequately for [their] own care”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 43-47-5(q) (covering 
individuals “whose ability to perform the normal activities of daily living or to provide for his or her 
own care . . . is impaired”). 
195. CAL. PENAL CODE § 368(b)(1); see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-7(a) (2020) 
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to abuse, neglect, exploit, or emotionally abuse any protected 
person.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-451(A)(1)(a), (c) (prohibiting “[i]ntentional infliction of 
physical harm” and “[u]nreasonable confinement”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.990(2) (West 2020) 
(“Any person who knowingly abuses or neglects an adult is guilty of a . . . felony.”).  
196. See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-3(8) (“[I]llegal or improper use of a disabled adult or 
elder person . . . through undue influence, coercion, harassment, duress, deception, false 
representation, false pretense, or other similar means.”). The precise mens rea for financial 
exploitation statutes varies between jurisdictions, but generally requires that the defendant act 
“knowingly.” See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6.5-103(7.5)(a) (“knowingly”); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 31, § 3913(a) (“knowingly or recklessly”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(b)(1) 
(“knowingly and willfully”). This means that the culprit needs to be aware of the relevant facts and 
likely consequences of her conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b)(i)–(ii) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
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coercion, harassment, duress, deception, false representation, 
false pretense, or other similar means for one’s own or another’s 
profit or advantage.197 
Some components of financial exploitation laws are relatively 
straightforward. For instance, outlawing the acquisition of an elder’s 
assets through “coercion,” “duress,” “deception,” “false representation,” 
or “false pretense” breaks little new ground.198 Indeed, states already 
recognize the offenses of theft by extortion199 and deception.200 Thus, 
when applied to these crimes, financial exploitation laws merely empower 
judges to impose enhanced penalties on defendants who prey on 
the vulnerable.201 
But other aspects of financial exploitation legislation are veritable 
minefields. For starters, none of the statutes cited above elaborates on the 
meaning of “illegal” or “improper” conduct. Accordingly, as one financial 
exploitation defendant objected, these empty word balloons permit states 
to imprison people for behavior that merely “offend[s] the sensitivities or 
 
197. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-3(8); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6.5-103(7.5)(a) (prohibiting 
“deception, harassment, intimidation, or undue influence”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3902(12)(a) 
(“deception, intimidation, or undue influence”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/17-56(c) (“undue 
influence, breach of a fiduciary relationship, fraud, deception, extortion, or use of the assets or 
resources contrary to law”); IOWA CODE § 235B.2(5)(c) (“undue influence, harassment, duress, 
deception, false representation, or false pretenses”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5417(2)(a) (“[u]ndue 
influence, coercion, harassment, duress, deception, false representation, false pretense or [a 
transaction] without adequate consideration”); MINN. STAT. § 609.2335(2)(i) (“undue influence, 
harassment, or duress”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(b)(2) (“deception, intimidation, or 
undue influence”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 43-47-5(i) (“the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable person 
or his resources for another’s profit, advantage or unjust enrichment, with or without the consent of 
the vulnerable person”); MO. REV. STAT. § 570.145(1), (2), (8) (2020) (“[d]eceit,” “[c]oercion,” and 
“[u]ndue influence”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-358 (“undue influence, breach of a fiduciary relationship, 
deception, extortion, intimidation, force or threat of force, isolation, or any unlawful means”); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 200.5092(3)(a) (“deception, intimidation or undue influence”); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-31-07.1(1)(a) (2020) (“deception, intimidation, or undue influence”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-
35-10(3)(c) (“(i) undue influence, (ii) harassment, (iii) duress, (iv) force, (v) coercion, or 
(vi) swindling”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111(9)(a)(i) (West 2020) (“undue influence . . . deception 
or intimidation”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-102(ix)(a) (“deception, harassment, intimidation or 
undue influence”). 
198. See GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-3(8). 
199. See State v. Mendoza-Tapia, 273 P.3d 676, 679–80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). 
200. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (AM. L. INST. 1985); State v. Miller, 590 N.W.2d 45, 46–47 
(Iowa 1999); Germaine Music v. Universal Songs of Polygram, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1304 (D. Nev. 
2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 130 F. App’x 153 (9th Cir. 2005). 
201. See, e.g., State v. Buller, 582 S.W.3d 124, 125–27 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (upholding thirty-year 
sentence for defendant who “engaged in a systematic scam” to trick an elderly and gullible woman 
into surrendering at least $50,000, which the defendant spent on “gambling, drinking, buying vehicles, 
and investing”); Kohn, supra note 38, at 10 (“[I]n many cases, the explicit criminalization of elder 
abuse simply creates new penalties for behavior that was already criminal and could have been 
prosecuted under existing criminal laws.”).  
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moral compass of the prosecutor or members of a jury.”202 
As a result, broad definitions of “financial exploitation” may be 
unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”203 As a result, under the void for vagueness rule, a “criminal statute 
must clearly define the conduct it proscribes.”204 A law flunks this test if 
it either “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of 
what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages 
seriously discriminatory enforcement.”205 But because judges must 
evaluate “whether a statute is vague as applied to the particular facts at 
issue,” a defendant whose actions are obviously prohibited lacks standing 
to complain about how the law might be “applied to the conduct 
of others.”206 
Some courts have recognized that financial exploitation laws are fatally 
imprecise. For example, in Cuda v. State,207 James Cuda convinced an 
eighty-year-old man to make nearly $1,000,000 in unsuitable 
investments.208 Cuda was accused of violating a Florida statute that made 
it a felony to “exploit[] an aged person . . . by the improper or illegal use 
or management” of their assets.209 The Florida Supreme Court held that 
the words “improper” and “illegal” failed to specify exactly what behavior 
was impermissible.210 In addition, the justices were alarmed by the fact 
that “the determination of a standard of guilt is left to be supplied by the 
courts or juries.”211 Thus, the Court struck down the statute as 
“unconstitutionally vague.”212 
 
202. Brief of Appellant Nicholas Marks at 44, Marks v. State, 623 S.E.2d 504 (Ga. 2005) 
(No. S05A1729), 2005 WL 4829479, at *44.  
203. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
204. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983) (“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”). 
205. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).  
206. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2010) (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Ests. 
v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)). 
207. 639 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1994). 
208. Id. at 23; see also Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 1, Cuda, 639 So. 2d 22 (No. 82,203), 
1993 WL 13012761, at *1.  
209. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 23 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 415.111(5) (1991)). 
210. Id. at 23, 25. 
211. Id. at 24 (quoting Locklin v. Pridgeon, 30 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 1947)). 
212. Id. at 25; see also Decker v. State, 2008-CT-01621-SCT (¶23) (Miss. 2011), 66 So. 3d 654, 
658 (expressing discomfort at a similar statute’s “broad reach,” but avoiding the constitutional issue 
by deciding the dispute on other grounds). But see State v. Sailer, 684 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Del. Super. 
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But other judges have ducked the issue by finding that the defendant’s 
conduct was so “clearly prohibited, [that] he lacks standing to challenge 
the statute based on another’s hypothetical conduct.”213 For instance, in 
February 2020, the Court of Appeals of Utah rejected a vagueness 
challenge to a financial exploitation law in State v. Jones.214 David Jones, 
who held a power of attorney for his father, loaned himself the money to 
start two restaurants and to cover his own living expenses.215 When 
Jones’s ventures failed, his father was evicted from his assisted living 
facility.216 Jones was found guilty of “unjustly or improperly us[ing] or 
manag[ing] the resources of a vulnerable adult.”217 In the state court of 
appeals, Jones argued that “‘unjust’ and ‘improper’ are subjective terms” 
that “could lead to charges against virtually anyone who uses a vulnerable 
adult’s resources.”218 The judges rejected this argument, observing that 
“any vagueness inherent in the language of the exploitation of a 
vulnerable adult statute” was irrelevant because “Jones’s conduct in this 
case was clearly proscribed.”219 
The only due process challenge to criminal undue influence reached a 
similar result.220 In State v. Ahart,221 a caretaker had written large checks 
on the victim’s account and hired her friends and relatives to work for the 
victim at outrageous salaries.222 She was accused of acquiring assets from 
a dependent adult through undue influence, and she moved to dismiss the 
charges as void for vagueness.223 A Kansas trial court denied her request 
and the state court of appeals affirmed.224 The appellate panel reasoned 
 
Ct. 1995) (refusing to follow Cuda and citing dictionaries to conclude that “‘illegal’ is defined as 
‘prohibited by law’” and “improper” means “not in keeping with accepted standards of what is right” 
(quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 899, 909 (3d ed. 1992))). 
213. State v. Jones, 2020 UT App 31, ¶ 55, 462 P.3d 372, 386 (quoting State v. Jones, 2018 UT 
App 110, ¶ 16, 427 P.3d 538); Marks v. State, 623 S.E.2d 504, 508–09 (Ga. 2005) (“[O]ne whose 
own conduct may be constitutionally proscribed will not be heard to challenge a law because it may 
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others.” (quoting Hubbard v. State, 352 S.E.2d 383, 384 
(Ga. 1987))).  
214. 2020 UT App 31, 462 P.3d 372. 
215. See id. ¶ 2–9, 462 P.3d at 376–77.  
216. See id. ¶ 7, 462 P.3d at 377. 
217. See id. ¶ 54, 462 P.3d at 385 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2012)). 
218. Brief of Appellant at 40, Jones, 2020 UT App 31, 462 P.3d 372 (No. 20170815-CA), 2018 
WL 10637372, at *40. 
219. Jones, 2020 UT App 31, ¶ 21, 462 P.3d at 386. 
220. State v. Ahart, No. 108,086, 2013 WL 5303521, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2013). 
221. No. 108,086, 2013 WL 5303521 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2013). 
222. See id. at *5. 
223. See id. at *1. 
224. See id.  
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that the phrase “undue influence” is “used in several related legal 
contexts” and thus could be understood by “a person of common 
intelligence.”225 Yet the court also admitted that nailing down “a precise 
definition is difficult” and did not even attempt to articulate the rule that 
the defendant had violated.226 Ultimately, the judges upheld the statute as 
applied and remarked that “[a]lthough there may be cases at the margin in 
which a closer question would be presented, this is not such a case.”227 
Thus, for better or for worse, financial exploitation statutes cast a wide 
net by outlawing the acquisition of an elder’s assets by unseemly or 
distasteful measures. However, until those prohibitions are more 
thoroughly ventilated in the courts, the scope and enforceability of 
financial exploitation statutes will remain uncertain. And as we discuss 
next, prosecutors are also combatting similar behavior by stretching the 
contours of theft law. 
B. Estate Theft 
Incapacity has long been grounds to strike down a gift, contract, will, 
or trust.228 But recently, this complex doctrine has spilled over into 
criminal law. As this section explains, a rising number of states have 
recognized an offense that we call “estate theft”: accepting an end-of-life 
transfer from a donor who is mentally compromised. 
The backdrop of this discussion is the relationship between consent and 
theft. In general, the victim’s consent can be a defense to a charge if it 
“negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm 
or evil sought to be prevented.”229 Theft is a prime example. That crime 
(which is still called larceny in some states) is the unlawful taking of the 
“property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof.”230 It requires a 
“trespass”: the hostile appropriation of the victim’s assets.231 In turn, there 
 
225. See id. at *4. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at *5. 
228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM. L. 
INST. 2003) (describing capacity standard for wills, will substitutes, irrevocable transfers, and 
lifetime gifts). 
229. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10(a) 
(West 2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311 (2020). The victim’s consent is not a defense to other crimes, 
such as statutory rape. See State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tenn. 2013). 
230. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2(1) (AM. L. INST. 1980).  
231. See People v. March, 886 N.W.2d 396, 405 (Mich. 2016) (“[I]t [i]s the unlawful, or 
trespassory, ‘taking’ that define[s] the fundamental nature of the crime.”). Many states once 
recognized separate theft-like crimes such as larceny (dispossessing an owner of her property) and 
embezzlement (theft by someone who was lawfully entrusted with possession, like a fiduciary). See 
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is no trespass—and thus no theft—“when property is voluntarily 
surrendered.”232 
Questions about consent are relatively straightforward in most theft 
prosecutions. Often, the injured party’s “lack of consent is presumed.”233 
Consider “theft by stealth,” such as surreptitiously removing a wallet from 
someone’s backpack on the subway. Because the victim is “unaware that 
his pocket [i]s being picked,” the victim’s lack of assent is blazingly 
obvious.234 Similarly, other theft-like crimes involve “ineffective 
consent.”235 In these cases—which include robbery and extortion—
victims actually give their property away, but this volitional act has no 
legal significance because “it is induced by force, duress or deception.”236 
These situations are so intuitive that the Model Penal Code remarks that 
“the law on the point is neither difficult nor controversial.”237 
Yet there is another form of “ineffective consent” that, until recently, 
prosecutors had rarely invoked in theft cases. A person cannot consent if 
“youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication” makes them “unable to 
make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the [illegal] 
conduct.”238 The Model Penal Code only briefly mentions how this rule 
 
George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 469 (1976) (noting that 
the law once distinguished between “larceny, embezzlement, larceny by trick, and obtaining property 
by false pretenses”). Many jurisdictions have now consolidated these crimes under the umbrella of 
“theft.” See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 484(a) (West 2020) (criminalizing both the act of taking “the 
personal property of another” and “appropriate[ing] property which has been entrusted to 
[the defendant]”).  
232. Fussell v. United States, 505 A.2d 72, 73 (D.C. 1986); see also Lowe v. State, 32 So. 956, 957 
(Fla. 1902) (“[A] taking by the voluntary consent of the owner . . . does not constitute larceny.”); 1 
CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 46 (15th ed. 1993) (“[C]onsent destroys the 
criminal character of an act of . . . taking the property of another which would otherwise 
constitute larceny.”).  
233. Jones v. State, 666 So. 2d 960, 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
234. Murray v. State, 135 A.2d 314, 316 (Md. 1957); Goertz v. State, 233 P. 768, 768 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1925) (explaining that the circumstances surrounding theft charges “clearly negat[e] any 
inference that consent to the taking of the property was obtained”).  
235. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(a)–(d) (AM. L. INST. 1985); see also J. H. Beale, Jr., Consent 
in the Criminal Law, 8 HARV. L. REV. 317, 326 (1895) (distinguishing between “lack of consent” and 
“ineffectiveness of consent”). 
236. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(d); Burkhalter v. State, 247 S.W. 539, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1922) (explaining that the victim of a robbery only hands over his property “in fear of death, and 
against his will”); 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (defining “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or 
under color of official right”). 
237. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.11 cmt. 3 (AM. L. INST., Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1985) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE COMMENTARIES]. 
238. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3)(b) (2020); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 702-235(2) (2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311(c) (2020); cf. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
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applies to theft, remarking that it might be triggered if “[a] 
drunk . . . ‘consents’ to the taking of his property.”239 Likewise, until the 
end of the twentieth century, only a handful of courts had grappled with 
whether a victim’s impairment transformed a seemingly-consensual 
transaction into a theft.240 
But recently, states have begun testing the boundaries of theft law by 
prosecuting individuals who received property from incapacitated donors. 
For example, in People v. Camiola,241 a senile and elderly woman 
executed a series of transfers to the defendant.242 A jury found the 
defendant guilty of theft.243 A New York appellate court affirmed, noting 
“the paucity of [relevant] case law,” but holding that “the victim was 
incapable of consenting to defendant’s actions and that [the] defendant 
was cognizant of her diminished mental capacity.”244 Likewise, 
legislatures and judges in Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, 
and Utah have adopted similar rules.245 In some states, donees can be 
 
§ 31.01(3)(C) (West 2020) (“Consent is not effective if [it is] . . . given by a person who by reason of 
youth, mental disease or defect, or intoxication is known by the actor to be unable to make reasonable 
property dispositions.”). 
239. MODEL PENAL CODE COMMENTARIES, supra note 237, at § 2.11 cmt. 3. 
240. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 82 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Mo. 1935) (describing a “unique” case in which 
prosecutors “relie[d] upon the incapacity, because of impaired mental faculties, of [the elderly victim] 
to consent to the taking”). Several of these cases are from Texas, which deems a transfer to be theft 
when consent is “given by a person who by reason of advanced age is known by the [defendant] to 
have a diminished capacity to make informed and rational decisions about the reasonable disposition 
of property.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(3)(E); Porter v. State, No. 04-99-00115-CR, 2000 WL 
863092, at *4 (Tex. App. June 28, 2000) (holding that the victim “was unable to give effective consent 
to the alleged incidents of theft because of her diminished mental capacity and numerous health 
problems, including depression, severe dementia, and Alzheimers disease”); Cook v. State, No. A14-
91-00865-CR, 1992 WL 91284, at *6 (Tex. App. May 7, 1992) (finding defendant guilty of estate 
theft when the victim’s “incompetence was readily apparent to everyone she came in contact with 
after a few minutes of conversation”). 
241. 639 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div. 1996). 
242. Id. at 36. The opinion mentions that the victim transmitted the property through written 
instruments, but does not specify whether they were deeds, gifts, or contracts. See id. 
243. See id. 
244. Id. 
245. Some jurisdictions have woven estate theft into elder abuse statutes. See FLA. STAT. 
§ 825.103(1)(b) (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-07.1 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 843.4(1)(b) 
(2020); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-68-2(a)(2) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111(9)(a)(ii) (West 
2020). Thus, these laws only apply if the victim is older than a certain age or disabled (or both). See, 
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 825.103(1) (protecting “elderly person[s] or disabled adult[s]”). In addition, this 
form of estate theft requires that the defendant “know[] or should know that the vulnerable adult lacks 
the capacity to consent.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111(9)(a)(ii). Conversely, other states have 
adopted estate theft through the common law. This species of estate theft covers all victims (not just 
elders) but insists that the defendant had actual (not constructive) knowledge “of the victim’s 
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found guilty of theft if they “know[] or reasonably should know that the 
elderly person or disabled adult lacks the capacity to consent.”246 
Estate theft can be a potent weapon against people who rip off impaired 
seniors. For example, in Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire,247 David St. Hilaire 
was neighbors with Erika Magill, who was eighty-six and had lived in the 
same home for half a century.248 After Magill’s husband died, St. Hilaire 
offered to purchase the property.249 To put it mildly, Magill refused: 
She expressed her resolve not to sell to [St. Hilaire] in colorful 
language. She told one person, “That son of a bitch wants my 
house, and he’s not getting it.” She said to another that there was 
“no way in hell” she would sell to [St. Hilaire] and that her late 
husband would “flip over in his grave” if she did.250 
But then Magill broke her hip and her health declined to the point where 
she was “incoherent and incapable of expressing herself.”251 St. Hilaire 
went to Magill’s bedside and convinced her to deed her residence to 
him.252 Previously, no Massachusetts court had ever imposed liability for 
theft under similar circumstances.253 But the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that St. Hilaire would be guilty if the jury found that Magill lacked mental 
capacity and that St. Hilaire knew about Magill’s impairment.254 
 
diminished capacity.” People v. Gbohou, 718 N.Y.S.2d 791, 795 (Sup. Ct. 2000); People v. Larson, 
No. B292764, 2020 WL 90813, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2020) (affirming conviction of estate theft 
when victim “was mentally incapable of consenting to give [the defendant] money from her bank 
account”); State v. Calonico, 770 A.2d 454, 465–66 (Conn. 2001) (“[T]he trial court reasonably could 
have found that the victim’s mental incapacity rendered her incapable of consenting to the defendant’s 
financial stratagem and that the defendant was aware of the victim’s mental incapacity.”); Deranger 
v. State, 652 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting defendant’s argument “that there is 
insufficient evidence of theft because the victim signed the checks and gave them to her”); McCay v. 
State, 476 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex. App. 2015) (“[W]hen an actor appropriates property knowing its 
owner cannot give effective consent to the transfer, the appropriation—or attempted appropriation—
is a criminal offense, not a probate matter.”). 
246. See FLA. STAT. § 825.103(1)(b). 
247. 21 N.E.3d 968 (Mass. 2015).  
248. Id. at 971. 
249. See id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 972. 
252. See id. 
253. See Brief and Record Appendix of for the Defendant on Appeal from Guilty Finding in the 
Superior Court at 21–22, St. Hilaire, 21 N.E.3d 968 (No. SJC-11566), 2014 WL 1575668, at *21–22. 
254. See St. Hilaire, 21 N.E.3d at 979. The trial judge had ruled that theft “may be proved by 
evidence that (1) the victim lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction she entered into 
with the defendant; and (2) the defendant knew or should have known that she lacked such capacity.” 
Id. at 970–71. Applying this standard, the jury had convicted St. Hilaire. See id. at 970. The Supreme 
Judicial Court remanded the matter, holding that because theft is a specific intent crime, the 
prosecution needed to demonstrate that St. Hilaire actually knew that Magill lacked capacity. See id. 
at 978–79. 
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Other estate theft cases have been less clear-cut. For instance, in Gainer 
v. State,255 Frances Gainer, a beautician at a nursing home, befriended 
eighty-three-year-old Margaret Endicott.256 Endicott, who suffered from 
Parkinson’s Disease, had no close family, and Gainer visited her every 
day.257 What happened next initially seems alarming. Endicott had 
previously been thrifty, but she started to write large checks to Gainer and 
also added her as a co-signatory with the right of survivorship on her 
financial accounts.258 Gainer used these funds to purchase a Corvette, a 
sailboat, a computer, a tanning bed, and jewelry.259 But there was also 
evidence that Endicott was paying Gainer back for her companionship. 
For instance, Endicott’s doctor described their relationship as so “loving 
and devoted” that he assumed they were mother and daughter.260 
Nevertheless, after Endicott died, Gainer was convicted of estate theft.261 
An Alabama appellate court upheld the verdict despite admitting that the 
case was marred by the worst evidence problem and it could only 
speculate about Endicott’s intent.262 
In another complication, the role of civil principles in estate theft cases 
is unclear. Some judges treat the issue as a pure matter of criminal law. 
For example, in Fanuiel v. State,263 Wade Watkins, who was suffering 
from dementia, gave his home and an annuity to Shirley Fanuiel, his 
goddaughter.264 Fanuiel was then convicted of estate theft.265 On appeal, 
Fanuiel argued that the state had failed to prove that Watkins was 
incapacitated on the specific dates that he had executed the transfers.266 
However, a Texas appellate court declined to apply this settled aspect of 
civil law in a criminal case, reasoning that “that is not the standard of 
 
255. 553 So. 2d 673 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). 
256. See id. at 675–76. 
257. See id. at 675, 683–84. 
258. See id. at 676. 
259. See id. 
260. Id. at 684. Conversely, Gainer also isolated Endicott and did not always take good care of her. 
See id. at 677 (describing an incident in which one of Endicott’s neighbors “found her alone, semi-
conscious on her bed, and lying in her own excrement”). 
261. See id. at 675. 
262. See id. at 681. A decedent’s unavailability to testify cut the other way in State v. Richardson. 
288 P.3d 995 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). The defendant persuaded a morphine-addled elderly victim to deed 
her house to her nephew. See id. at 996. Later, when discussing the transfer, the victim allegedly “said 
that she had been robbed or that her home had been taken from her.” Id. at 997. Based on the victim’s 
statements, the jury convicted the defendant of estate theft. See id. at 996. The Oregon Court of 
Appeals reversed because the victim’s account of the events was hearsay. See id. at 998. 
263. No. 14-17-00297-CR, 2019 WL 546846 (Tex. App. Feb. 12, 2019). 
264. Id. at *1–4; see also Appellant’s Brief at 5, Fanuiel, No. 14-17-00297-CR, 2017 WL 2931414. 
265. See Fanuiel, 2019 WL 546846, at *5. 
266. See id. at *6. 
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proof required in a criminal theft case such as we are presented with 
here.”267 Thus, as the court saw it, estate theft, like robbery and extortion, 
hinges on the criminal doctrine of “ineffective consent,”268 rather than 
“similar concepts from the civil law.”269 
At the opposite pole, in State v. Maxon,270 a Kansas appellate court not 
only assumed that civil incapacity rules applied, but refused to recognize 
estate theft as an offense.271 Bea Bergman, who was elderly, suffered from 
bipolar disorder.272 After Bea’s husband died, she befriended Ron and 
Joyce Maxon.273 Although Bea had once been frugal, she began to transfer 
assets to the Maxons.274 In particular, Bea sold her house for about half of 
its market value to two of the Maxons’s children, Christopher and Jodi, 
and also bought a new truck for Christopher.275 A jury found Christopher 
and Jodi guilty of estate theft.276 But the appellate panel reversed, 
reasoning that it would be unfair to predicate criminal liability on 
byzantine civil incapacity principles: 
The initial dilemma presented by the [s]tate’s argument is 
determining the legal standard that should be applied to determine 
the level of incapacity that would vitiate the transferor’s consent. 
Without some standard, a donee would not have a sufficiently 
adequate warning that his or her acceptance of a gift is a theft and 
the law would not adequately guard against arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Does a transferor have to possess the 
capacity to contract? . . . Or, do we look at the rather minimal 
 
267. Id. at *6–7. 
268. The Texas Penal Code’s subchapter on theft provides that: 
Consent is not effective if . . . given by a person who by reason of . . . mental disease or 
defect . . . is known by the actor to be unable to make reasonable property dispositions; [or] given 
by a person who by reason of advanced age is known by the actor to have a diminished capacity 
to make informed and rational decisions about the reasonable disposition of property. 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(3)(C), (E) (West 2020). 
269. See Fanuiel, 2019 WL 546846, at *6; see also People v. Cain, 605 N.W.2d 28, 46 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999) (affirming trial court’s jury instruction on capacity in estate theft case that deviated from 
the relevant civil law standard); McCay v. State, 476 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. App. 2015) (“In a 
criminal proceeding, the State can prove the accused attempted to appropriate property unlawfully in 
many ways. One of those ways is by proving the owner did not give effective consent.”).  
270. 79 P.3d 202 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).  
271. Id. at 209 (declining to hold that “a donee can be convicted of theft for accepting a gift from 
a mentally impaired donor”). 
272. See id. at 204–05. 
273. See id. at 205. 
274. See id. at 205, 211. 
275. See id. at 205. 
276. See id. 
Horton & Weisbord (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2021  10:32 AM 
596 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:561 
 
capacity needed to make a testamentary disposition?277 
Similarly, other judges have balked at criminalizing conduct that was 
once the exclusive province of civil law. For example, in People v. 
Brock,278 an elderly man named Norman Roussey suffered from crippling 
anxiety.279 Ronald Leon Block helped Roussey manage his disorder by 
serving as a lay psychologist.280 In return, Roussey gave Block  more than 
$600,000 in gifts.281 As Roussey explained, “I help [Block and] he helps 
me.”282 Block was convicted of estate theft after the trial judge used jury 
instructions from contracts cases, asking whether “Roussey’s consent 
resulted from [Block] taking unfair advantage of Roussey’s ‘weak 
mind.’”283 The court of appeals overturned the verdict, opining that the 
state “provide[d] no reason in law or logic for concluding that the same 
factors that make a contract voidable or a will ineffective should, without 
more, justify a criminal conviction for theft.”284 
Therefore, estate theft is both a powerful check against wrongdoing and 
a source of great uncertainty. As we discuss next, the abuser rule—a 
quasi-criminal penalty that drastically expands the scope of the slayer 
doctrine—is also a double-edged sword. 
C. The Abuser Rule 
The slayer doctrine has been divisive since it emerged in the nineteenth 
century.285 Yet this section explains that states have recently doubled 
down on it by experimenting with “abuser rules”: expanded slayer statutes 
that disinherit people for committing elder abuse.286 
Abuser rules are slowly spreading throughout the U.S. The first such 
law appeared in Arizona in 1996.287 It came on the heels of articles in the 
Arizona Republic that had exposed rampant “financial exploitation and 
physical abuse in adult care homes.”288 To address this crisis, lawmakers 
 
277. Id. at 210 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court affirmed Christopher and Jodi’s 
conviction for committing undue influence under the state’s elder abuse statute. See id. at 207. 
278. 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 879 (Ct. App. 2006). 
279. Id. at 881. 
280. See id. at 881–82. 
281. See id. at 881. 
282. Id. at 882. 
283. Id. at 887. 
284. Id. at 888. 
285. See supra section I.B. 
286. See infra text accompanying notes 287–313. 
287. See 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1401–03.  
288. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4, Newman v. Newman (In re Estate of Newman), 196 P.3d 863 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (No. 1 CA-CV 07-0373), 2007 WL 2983305 [hereinafter Newman Reply Brief].  
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enacted penalties for people who exploit “a position of trust and 
confidence” over a vulnerable adult.289 Borrowing from the slayer rule, 
the statute required violators to “forfeit[] all benefits with respect to the 
estate of [a] deceased [victim].”290 This hardline stance against elder abuse 
resonated with lawmakers. Because most mistreatment is committed by 
the victim’s spouse or adult children—people who are likely also the 
victim’s heirs and beneficiaries—disinheritance seemed to be a promising 
deterrent.291 As a result, California, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Michigan, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia passed their own 
abuser laws.292 
However, these jurisdictions disagree about how to calibrate their 
abuser rules. First, there is no consensus about what type of wrongdoing 
should activate the penalty. Although some statutes apply to any kind of 
elder abuse, including violence,293 others confine the offense to 
financial exploitation.294 
Second, abuser legislation punishes wrongdoers in divergent ways. 
Most strip abusers of any interest they would take from the victim through 
intestacy, will, trust, pension, life insurance, pay-on-death account, or any 
other form of joint ownership.295 For example, Illinois broadly mandates 
 
289. 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1402. The law defined “position of trust and confidence” to include 
fiduciaries, such as a conservator, but also less formal arrangements, such as “[o]ne who has assumed 
a duty to provide care.” Id. at 1402–03. 
290. Id. The current version of the law can be found at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456 (2020). 
291. See Kohn, supra note 38, at 4 (discussing domestic elder abuse, as opposed to abuse that 
occurs in institutions). 
292. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2021); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-6.2(b) (2020); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 381.280(1) (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(e)(1) (West 2020); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2803(1) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.465(1) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 11.84.020 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2 (2020). 
293. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(a)(1) (covering “physical abuse, neglect, or financial 
abuse”); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.457 (applying to “physical abuse . . . or financial abuse”); 755 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/2-6.2 (governing both forms); W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2 (governing both physical and 
financial abuse). 
294. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456(A) (applying to people who abuse their position 
of trust and confidence and use an elder’s assets for their own purposes); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 8-801(b)(1) (governing the illegal acquisition of an elder or dependent adult’s property with 
an intent to deprive them of it); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.010(1) (“‘Abuser’ means any person who 
participates . . . in the willful and unlawful financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult.”). 
295. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456 (mandating that an abuser “forfeit[s] all or a portion of 
the person’s . . . [i]nterest” in the victim’s estate); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280(1) (“[T]he person 
so convicted forfeits all interest in and to the property of the decedent.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 700.2803(1) (requiring abusers to “forfeit[] all benefits . . . with respect to the decedent’s estate”); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.020 (“No slayer or abuser shall in any way acquire any property or receive 
any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent.”); W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2(c) (declaring that 
abusers “may not take or acquire any money or property, real or personal, or any interest in the money 
or property, from the victim”). 
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that offenders “shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by 
reason of the death of th[e] elderly person.”296 Conversely, California 
merely bars abusers from inheriting any funds the victim or the victim’s 
estate wins in a civil complaint stemming from the underlying abuse.297 
This modest step closes the possible loophole that would otherwise allow 
abusers to pay damages to themselves as beneficiaries of the victim’s 
estate. Likewise, Maryland only forces abusers to disgorge any amount 
that they have stolen from the victim and not yet returned.298 
Third, states view the link between criminal and probate proceedings 
differently. The majority approach disinherits heirs or beneficiaries only 
if they are convicted of felony elder abuse.299 This is a sharp departure 
from the norm that an acquittal in a criminal trial does not conclusively 
preclude application of the slayer rule in the probate matter.300 In contrast, 
California and Washington follow the conventional view that an abuser 
can be acquitted of a crime but found civilly liable.301 
Fourth, some abuser statutes address the possibility of the victim 
forgiving the offender. Unlike the slayer context, where the death and the 
crime almost always occur simultaneously, time may pass between elder 
abuse and the victim’s demise.302 During this interim, victims might 
decide that they still want to leave assets to an abuser. Accordingly, 
Illinois, Kentucky, and Washington provide that the disinheritance 
 
296. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-6.2(b). 
297. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(c) (stating that abusers cannot “receive any property, damages, 
or costs that are awarded to the decedent’s estate [for elder abuse]”). 
298. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(e)(1) (“If a defendant fails to restore fully the 
property taken or its value, . . . the defendant is disqualified, to the extent of the defendant’s failure to 
restore the property or its value, from inheriting . . . from the estate, insurance proceeds, or property 
of the victim of the offense.”). 
299. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280(1) (stating that if anyone “takes the life of the 
decedent or victimizes the decedent by the commission of any felony under [the state elder abuse 
statute] and in either circumstance is convicted therefor, the person so convicted forfeits all interest 
in and to the property of the decedent”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2803(1) (“An individual 
who . . . is convicted of committing abuse, neglect, or exploitation with respect to the decedent forfeits 
all benefits under this article with respect to the decedent’s estate.”). 
300. See supra text accompanying notes 139–144. 
301. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(a)(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.150(2) (2020) (“[A] superior 
court finding by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that a person participated in conduct 
constituting financial exploitation against the decedent is conclusive for purposes of determining 
whether a person is an abuser under this section.”). In Illinois, an abuser must forfeit their inheritance 
if either they are convicted of felony physical abuse or neglect or found liable for financial 
exploitation by a preponderance of the evidence. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-6.2(b); see also 
Dudley v. FNBC Bank & Tr. (In re Estate of Lewy), 2018 IL App (1st) 172552, ¶¶ 1–12, 112 N.E.3d 
1062, 1064–66 (holding that the abuser statute did not apply to a caregiver who pled guilty to 
misdemeanor battery of an elder). 
302. Cf. Hirsch, supra note 136, at 2214 (observing that “[a] mortally wounded testator might linger 
for a time, and in the aftermath forgive his or her slayer, republishing the original will”). 
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penalty does not apply if the victim “reaffirms” or “ratifies” the original 
estate plan.303 
Fifth, a few laws give courts discretion not to disinherit the abuser. 
These states recognize that robotic application of the penalty can be harsh. 
For example, Arizona’s original statute unequivocally declared that a 
wrongdoer “forfeits” any inheritance from the victim.304 In Newman v. 
Newman (In re Estate of Newman),305 an Arizona appellate court carried 
out this directive and disinherited a child who had quit his job to take care 
of his cancer-ridden mother.306 In 2001, when Celia Newman fell ill, two 
of her kids stayed put on the East Coast.307 Conversely, Celia’s son, Max, 
blew up his life to care for her: 
During the period October 2001 through October 2002, Max (who 
was living in San Francisco at the time and working as a 
stockbroker) flew to Phoenix at least twenty-four (24) times to 
visit his mother. Most of the visits were three to four days in 
duration, requiring Max to miss one or two days of work each 
time. Ultimately, Celia persuaded Max to move to Phoenix, which 
he did in about October 2002.308 
Unfortunately, Max improperly transferred Celia’s retirement funds into 
an account that he co-owned and cut his sister out of Celia’s trust.309 
Despite the fact that Max “was at [Celia’s] beck and call 24/7,”310 the court 
held that “[u]nder the plain language of the statute, the forfeiture is 
mandatory and automatic if a violation . . . is found.”311 Shortly after the 
 
303. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-6.2(b) (requiring “clear and convincing evidence that the victim of 
that offense knew of the conviction or finding of civil liability and . . . expressed or ratified his or her 
intent to transfer the property, benefit, or interest to the [abuser]”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 381.280(2)(b) (apparently requiring only a preponderance of the evidence that the “decedent, with 
knowledge of the person’s disqualification, reaffirmed the[ir] right” to inherit); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 11.84.170(1)(a)–(b) (“An abuser is entitled to acquire or receive an interest in property or any other 
benefit described in this chapter if the court determines by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that 
the decedent: (a) Knew of the financial exploitation; and (b) Subsequently ratified his or her intent to 
transfer the property interest or benefit to that person.”).  
304. 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1402. 
305. 196 P.3d 863 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
306. Id. at 879; Petition for Removal of Adina Newman as Personal Representative and Trustee 
and Petition for Appointment of Neutral Independent Personal Representative and Trustee at 4, 
Newman v. Newman (In re Estate of Newman), No. PB2004-003475 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2007), 
2005 WL 5553573 [hereinafter Petition for Removal of Adina Newman] (describing the close 
relationship between the mother and son). 
307. See Newman Reply Brief, supra note 288, at 4. 
308. Petition for Removal of Adina Newman, supra note 306, at 4. 
309. See Newman, 196 P.3d at 866–67. 
310. Newman Reply Brief, supra note 288, at 15. 
311. Newman, 196 P.3d at 872. 
Horton & Weisbord (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2021  10:32 AM 
600 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:561 
 
decision, the Arizona legislature softened the language of the abuser 
statute, providing that judges “may” strip an abuser of “all or a portion” 
of the estate.312 In the same vein, Illinois and Washington give courts the 
power to limit the impact of the abuser rule “in any manner [that they] 
deem[] equitable.”313 
Finally, the constitutionality of the abuser rule is a blank slate. No case 
has yet grappled with whether the principle violates state constitutional 
provisions forbidding forfeiture and corruption of blood.314 
*   *   * 
Disputes over inheritances are spawning criminal and quasi-criminal 
proceedings. Undue influence has been transplanted into financial 
exploitation statutes. Incapacity has been repurposed as estate theft. And 
the slayer rule has been given a contemporary spin through the abuser 
doctrine. Although these punitive measures are a bulwark against the 
“virtual epidemic” of financial elder abuse,315 they also create 
constitutional friction and raise fresh questions of law and policy. Thus, 
the next Part proposes better ways to fuse two disciplines that have 
traditionally shared little in common. 
III. POLICY PROPOSALS 
This Part suggests three reforms to the nascent field of inheritance 
crime. First, it suggests dropping “undue influence” from the definition of 
“financial exploitation.” Second, it asserts that states should rely on civil 
precedent in estate theft prosecutions. Third, it contends that abuser 
statutes should contain safe harbors to avoid violating state constitutions 
and frustrating a decedent’s intent. 
A. Criminal Undue Influence 
For decades, commentators have argued that “[d]istinguishing between 
a product of free will and an instrument procured by undue influence is, 
 
312. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456(C)(1) (2020). 
313. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.170 (2020). Washington instructs courts to balance three factors 
when making this determination, including (1) the terms of the decedent’s estate plan, (2) the 
decedent’s “likely intent,” and (3) the harm the abuser caused. Id. Illinois only allows courts to decline 
to disinherit abusers who are found civilly (not criminally) liable. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-6.2(f) 
(2020).  
314. One commentator predicts that a statutory inheritance bar applied to individuals who 
wrongfully interfere with the decedent’s freedom of testation would not violate state constitutional 
forfeiture prohibitions under the owned interest rationale discussed above in section I.B. See Eike G. 
Hosemann, Protecting Freedom of Testation: A Proposal for Law Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
419, 464 (2014). 
315. Mark S. Lachs & Karl A. Pillemer, Elder Abuse, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1947, 1947 (2015). 
Horton & Weisbord (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2021  10:32 AM 
2021] INHERITANCE CRIMES 601 
 
at best, problematic.”316 However, some financial exploitation statutes 
make the use of undue influence a crime.317 This section argues that this 
choice is profoundly unwise. 
There are several drawbacks to criminalizing undue influence. For 
starters, doing so may violate the void for vagueness doctrine. 
Unfortunately, as Justice Frankfurter once quipped, constitutional 
vagueness “is itself an indefinite concept.”318 Indeed, the hallmark of the 
Court’s caselaw on the topic is its “lack of informing reasoning.”319 
Moreover, to challenge a statute as unconstitutionally vague, defendants 
must establish standing by demonstrating that they are not merely 
complaining about “the vagueness of the law as it might apply to the 
conduct of persons not before the court.”320 Despite the uphill battle, 
however, some of the recently enacted criminal undue influence statutes 
could be plausibly challenged under the void for vagueness doctrine. 
Recall that the void for vagueness rule demands two things from 
criminal laws.321 First, these statutes must “define the criminal offense 
with sufficient definiteness.”322 As the Court has explained, linguistic 
precision is indispensable to due process: 
Vague laws offend several important values. . . . [B]ecause we 
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, 
so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent 
by not providing fair warning.323 
Thus, a few courts have either held or implied that financial exploitation 
statutes that outlaw “improper,” “unfair,” or “illegal” behavior defy this 
mandate.324 These judges have reasoned that these words are “not defined 
within the statutes”325 and thus fail to offer a “clear explanation of the 
 
316. Wanless, supra note 95, at 1029; see also text accompanying notes 91–103. 
317. See supra note 197. 
318. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
319. A. G. A., Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 
67, 70–71 (1960); see also John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of 
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985) (“[T]here is no yardstick of impermissible 
indeterminacy.”); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Vagueness as Impossibility, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1049, 
1051 (2020) (“[T]he Court’s cases in this area leaves one wondering how lower courts and litigants 
are to tell the difference between statutes that are sufficiently definite and those that are not.”). 
320. State v. Montoya, 933 N.W.2d 558, 583 (Neb. 2019). 
321. See supra text accompanying notes 204–205. 
322. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
323. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
324. See supra text accompanying notes 207–227. 
325. Decker v. State, 2008-CT-01621-SCT (¶ 20) (Miss. 2011), 66 So. 3d 654, 658. 
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proscribed conduct.”326 
It is unclear whether criminal undue influence satisfies the “fair notice” 
mandate. In State v. Ahart, the only decision to confront a void for 
vagueness challenge to undue influence, a Kansas appellate court cited the 
rule’s common law heritage as proof that “a person of common 
intelligence c[ould] understand which conduct is prohibited.”327 However, 
this conclusion is debatable. On the one hand, Ahart is correct that judges 
usually reject vagueness attacks on phrases that have “a well-settled 
common-law meaning,”328 and undue influence has been around since the 
seventeenth century.329 But on the other hand, although there are scores of 
reported undue influence opinions, they do little more than “beg the 
underlying question: what influence is undue . . . ?”330 Indeed, because the 
rule is so fuzzy, attempts to define it “degenerate[] into nothing more than 
platitudes about ‘substituting one’s volition for another.’”331 Even in civil 
cases—where money, not a person’s liberty, hangs in the balance—
scholars have argued that “the doctrine does not comport with notions of 
legal fairness or notice.”332 Accordingly, there are colorable arguments 
both ways on the first component of the void for vagueness test. 
Second, even if a law’s text is sufficiently clear, it cannot “encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”333 by allowing police, 
 
326. Cuda v. State, 639 So. 2d 22, 25 (Fla. 1994). 
327. State v. Ahart, No. 108,086, 2013 WL 5303521, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2013); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 220–227. 
328. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
329. See supra text accompanying note 80. We are assuming for the sake of argument that financial 
exploitation statutes do incorporate the common law undue influence rule. But this is no sure thing. 
Some of these laws define “undue influence” in ways that resemble—but do not mirror—the 
conventional black letter test. For instance, Colorado describes the crime as “tak[ing] advantage of an 
at-risk person’s vulnerable state of mind, neediness, pain, or emotional distress.” COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 18-6.5-102(13) (2020). Likewise, Utah specifies that undue influence occurs if someone uses their 
“role, relationship, or power . . . to gain control deceptively over the decision making of [a] vulnerable 
adult.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111 (West 2020). Finally, Maryland and Nevada specify that 
“‘[u]ndue influence’ does not include the normal influence that one member of a family has over 
another.” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801 (West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5092 (2020). 
By contrast, courts tend to cite civil precedent in criminal undue influence cases, which suggests that 
there is a single, unified standard. See People v. Gayle, 2012 IL App (4th) 100132-U, ¶ 109 
(unpublished opinion); Tarray v. State, 979 A.2d 729, 738 (Md. 2009). A distinctive criminal version 
of the undue influence doctrine would probably be more susceptible to a due process challenge 
because the added uncertainty about what it means. 
330. Spivack, supra note 50, at 264.  
331. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative Analysis, 19 
DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 41, 43 (2008). 
332. Spivack, supra note 50, at 267; see also Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 74 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 285, 347 (2017) (“Undue influence has elicited an outpouring of scholarly commentary 
more voluminous than any other state-of-mind rule.”). 
333. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
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prosecutors, and juries to “pursue their personal predilections.”334 The 
Court has called this “the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine,” 
and it has evolved dramatically over time.335 Before the New Deal, the 
Justices cited concerns about “discriminatory enforcement” to strike down 
attempts to regulate businesses.336 For example, in United States v. L. 
Cohen Grocery Co.,337 the Court invalidated section 4 of the Food Control 
Act, which prohibited charging “unjust or unreasonable rate[s]” for 
necessary goods and services.338 The Court opined that the statute vested 
too much authority in the trier of fact by essentially “punish[ing] all acts 
[that are] . . . unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the court and 
jury.”339 That description fits criminal undue influence like a glove. 
Indeed, there may be no doctrine in all of law that is as much of an inkblot. 
Like the Food Control Act, undue influence statutes permit factfinders to 
penalize beneficiaries whose receipt of property violates their “idea[s] of 
what is fair and right.”340 
Even more to the point, the Warren and Burger Courts used the 
“discriminatory enforcement” inquiry for a starkly different purpose: to 
protect “nonconformists.”341 For instance, in Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville,342 a Florida city passed an anti-vagrancy ordinance that 
outlawed “prowling by auto” and “wandering or strolling around from 
place to place.”343 Citing the law, police arrested two Black men and two 
white women who were riding together in a car.344 The Court held that the 
ordinance’s open-ended terms provided a “tool for ‘harsh and 
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials[] against 
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.’”345 Similarly, in 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati,346 the Justices found that a Cincinnati 
regulation that barred gathering on the sidewalks and “annoying” others 
 
334. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974). 
335. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. 
336. See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 388, 393–94 (1926) (striking down 
minimum wage law); Champlin Refin. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 241–43 (1932) 
(invalidating statute that outlawed “waste” in the production of crude oil).  
337. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).  
338. Id. at 86 (quoting Food and Fuel Control Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-41, § 4, 40 Stat. 276, 
277 (amended 1919)).  
339. See id. at 89. 
340. Jaworski, supra note 20, at 88. 
341. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).  
342. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
343. Id. at 156 n.1, 158 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1971)).  
344. See id. at 158–59.  
345. Id. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940)).  
346. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).  
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was unconstitutional.347 As the Court explained, the law could be 
deployed “against those whose association together is ‘annoying’ because 
their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the 
majority of their fellow citizens.”348 Cases like Papachristou and Coates 
elucidate that the Due Process Clause overrides statutes that can propagate 
“majority prejudices about other, less powerful groups.”349 
This is precisely the accusation that trusts and estates scholars have 
been levying against undue influence.350 As Gary Spitko has explained, 
by delegating so much authority to courts and juries, undue influence 
harms “cultural minorities”351: 
[Undue influence] imperils any estate plan that disfavors the 
testator’s legal spouse or close blood relations in favor of non-
family beneficiaries. The[] doctrine[] also [is] sufficiently 
ambiguous that [it] provide[s] cover for a trier of fact that wishes 
to reorder an estate plan to conform to her own values. The trier 
of fact might wish to do so, particularly if the values reflected in 
the testator’s estate plan offend her sensibilities.352 
In civil litigation, this aspect of the rule is grounds for criticism and 
reform. But in criminal matters, it is an irremediable flaw. Thus, criminal 
undue influence could easily be unconstitutional.353 
On top of these due process concerns, criminalizing undue influence is 
 
347. Id. at 616.  
348. Id.  
349. Guyora Binder & Brenner Fissell, A Political Interpretation of Vagueness Doctrine, 2019 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1527, 1537; Tammy W. Sun, Equality by Other Means: The Substantive Foundations of 
the Vagueness Doctrine, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 149, 156 (2011) (noting that the Court has 
employed the “discriminatory enforcement” rationale to minimize a “law’s effect on minority and 
disadvantaged groups”).  
350. See supra text accompanying notes 91–103.  
351. Spitko, supra note 31, at 275 n.1 (defining “‘culture’ as a set of shared values and beliefs” and 
a member of a “‘cultural minority’ . . . as an individual whose core religious, political or social values 
and beliefs differ meaningfully and substantially from majoritarian norms”).  
352. Id. at 276.  
353. One potentially formidable counterargument is that the Court has suggested that “scienter 
requirements alleviate vagueness concerns.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007). The basic 
idea is that, by criminalizing the deliberate violation of a statute, lawmakers can ensure that nobody 
will violate it in “good faith.” Id. at 150 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979)). This 
sub-rule could come into play because, as noted, financial exploitation statutes only apply when a 
person “knowingly” commits undue influence. See supra text accompanying note 195; cf. State v. 
Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263, 276 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting a void for vagueness challenge to 
different language in a financial exploitation statute “because [it] includes a mens rea requirement”). 
Then again, as scholars have noted, although a scienter element might cure “fair notice” problems, it 
does not address the discrete issue of “discriminatory enforcement.” See, e.g., Mannheimer, supra 
note 319, at 1093 (arguing that “it is unclear how a scienter requirement can do anything to ameliorate 
the excessive delegation inherent in an otherwise vague statute”).  
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bad policy. The doctrine hinges on relationships and interactions that are 
plagued by evidentiary headaches and intense moral ambiguity. For one, 
the factfinder must divine the intent of a dead person. Because the star 
witness cannot testify, “a speculative element is necessarily introduced 
into the [case].”354 Moreover, the alleged wrongdoer is usually a caregiver 
or close friend. This theme runs through many of the matters already 
discussed. For instance, in State v. Maxon, the Maxons were charged with 
unduly influencing Bea Bergman, a lonely widow, even though they 
essentially adopted Bea into their family: 
Joyce [Maxon] became a frequent visitor at Bea’s house. She 
would transport Bea to antique shops, to the grocery store, to the 
doctor’s office, and to church. Eventually, Joyce was spending 
weekday nights at Bea’s house, and Bea would spend the 
weekend at Joyce’s house . . . . Bea attended Maxon family 
functions and wanted the Maxons to call her “Aunt Bea.”355 
Likewise, in People v. Brock, Ronald Brock purportedly unduly 
influenced Norman Roussey, but also helped him manage his anxiety by 
fielding 2,500 phone calls from him.356 Accordingly, the line between a 
gift that is the product of undue influence and an expression of gratitude 
is paper-thin. 
Criminal undue influence also upends procedural norms from probate 
litigation. Most criminal cases are tried to a jury.357 But trusts and estates 
scholars believe that “[f]ew questions are less well suited to the 
determination of a jury than . . . undue influence.”358 Indeed, juries are 
susceptible “to the emotional overlays which often pervade the trial”359 
and “decide without giving reasons,” which permits them to veto a 
decedent’s choices.360 Two (admittedly dated) empirical studies bear out 
this point. One looked at undue influence trials from Minnesota in the 
early twentieth century and concluded that juries were reversed on appeal 
 
354. Burkhalter v. Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d 93, 105 (Iowa 2013).  
355. State v. Maxon, 79 P.3d 202, 205 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003). 
356. People v. Brock, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 879, 882 (Ct. App. 2006). 
357. Ellis v. United States (In re Ellis), 356 F.3d 1198, 1234 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting). In federal court, roughly 86% of criminal trials are by jury. See Sean Doran, John D. 
Jackson & Michael L. Seigel, Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 1, 9–10 (1995). The numbers in state courts vary widely but indicate that jury trials remain 
customary. See id. at 10–11; T. Ward Frampton, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury 
Trial Rates Vary by State, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 191 (2012). 
358. Comment, Will Contests on Trial, 6 STAN. L. REV 91, 95 (1953). 
359. Id. 
360. Langbein, Will Contests, supra note 27, at 2043; Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons 
of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529, 530 (1990) (“[J]ury trials are less ‘legally 
fair’ than bench trials because juries are more likely to reach a verdict contrary to the law.”).  
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six times more often than judges.361 The other examined litigation from 
California between 1892 and 1953 and discovered that 62% of verdicts 
for contestants in undue influence cases were overturned for insufficiency 
of evidence.362 In fact, in 1990, policymakers in the Golden State cited 
these findings to abolish the right to a jury trial in contests.363 
Nevertheless, given the gravitational pull toward jury trials in criminal 
matters, most undue influence prosecutions will likely be by jury. 
To be sure, criminal defendants are also entitled to greater protection 
than parties in probate litigation. Prosecutors must prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.364 But this heightened burden does not mitigate the 
hazards of entrusting juries with deciding the “I know it when I see it” 
question of whether influence was “undue.”365 Because the underlying 
doctrine is so nebulous, and its pathologies are so well-documented, 
requiring stronger evidence of its existence does little to prevent jurors 
from deciding cases based on their gut feelings and prior beliefs.366 
Finally, deleting undue influence from the definition of “financial 
exploitation” would leave criminal elder abuse statutes largely intact. 
Indeed, these laws are spectacularly broad. For example, even without 
undue influence, they would prohibit a laundry list of deleterious conduct, 
such as “coercion, harassment, duress, deception, false representation, 
[and] false pretense.”367 Thus, courts would still have ample firepower to 
combat wrongdoers who target seniors. 
 
361. See Edward S. Bade, Jury Trial in Will Cases in Minnesota, 22 MINN. L. REV. 513, 516–
17 (1938).  
362. See Comment, supra note 358, at 92 n.4.  
363. See CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO PROBATE LAW 793 n.14 
(1987), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub159.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPT7-8EQW] 
(“[J]ury verdicts upholding a contest are reversed on appeal in the great majority of cases.”); CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 825 (West 2021) (providing that “there is no right to a jury trial” for contests). Other 
states are divided over the right to a jury trial for probate matters. Some courts hold that because 
“probate matters are generally equitable in nature, no right to a jury trial ordinarily exists in a probate 
case.” Riddell v. Edwards, 32 P.3d 4, 7 (Alaska 2001); see also Wilson v. Wilson (In re Estate of 
Johnson), 820 A.2d 535, 538 (D.C. 2003) (refusing to recognize a jury trial in probate matters); Foster 
v. Gilliam (In re Estate of Foster), 165 Wash. App. 33, 47, 268 P.3d 945, 952 (2011) (holding that 
there is no right to a jury in probate cases). Conversely, statutes in other states create a right to a jury 
for contests. See Athanas, supra note 360, at 537–40.  
364. See supra text accompanying note 139.  
365. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating “I know it when 
I see it” to explain why a movie was not “hard-core pornography”).  
366. For example, in People v. Brock the state tried to defend a jury verdict against the defendant 
for theft through undue influence by noting that the judge required proof of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 879, 889–90 (Ct. App. 2006). The California Court of Appeals 
rejected this argument, reasoning that a heightened standard of proof did not change the fact that 
undue influence should not be grounds for criminal liability. See id. at 890.   
367. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-3(8) (2020); see also sources cited supra note 197. 
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For these reasons, jurisdictions should decriminalize undue influence. 
Furthermore, as we discuss next, they ought to clarify the role of civil law 
in prosecutions for estate theft. 
B. Civil or Criminal Rules 
States disagree about the role that probate concepts play in estate theft 
cases. This section urges them to align civil and criminal law. 
Many jurisdictions view estate theft as a pure matter of criminal law. 
For example, judges have ignored the convention of discounting non-
contemporaneous evidence and the venerable distinctions between 
competence to make a gift, contract, or will.368 Instead they gloss over 
these nuances and merely instruct the jury to “evaluate the victim’s 
capacity.”369 For them, estate theft, like robbery and extortion, falls under 
the umbrella of criminal law’s “ineffective consent” rule, and raises the 
one-size-fits-all question of whether the victim’s decision to transfer 
property was an “act of reason accompanied with deliberation.”370 
This view is shortsighted. First, constructing separate doctrinal tracks 
for criminal and civil matters would sow confusion. Although civil 
incapacity is far from perfect, it has been fleshed out over the course of 
centuries and untold numbers of opinions.371 Therefore, it would be harder 
for beneficiaries to anticipate whether they might face charges if courts 
reinvented the proverbial wheel in criminal matters.372 
Second, a criminal-specific incapacity doctrine could breed anomalous 
results. For instance, some estate theft statutes define incompetence as 
being unable to “make . . . reasonable decisions.”373 This sets the bar 
below the threshold required for creating a valid will or revocable trust. 
As we observed, testamentary capacity is “the lowest level of mental 
 
368. See supra text accompanying notes 263–284. 
369. People v. Camiola, 639 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (App. Div. 1996).  
370. Shehany v. Lowry, 152 S.E. 114, 115 (Ga. 1930). One state, North Dakota, embraces a unique 
rule called the “civil dispute doctrine,” which “bars criminal prosecution if the case presents a 
‘legitimate dispute . . . on a unique issue of property, contract, or other civil law, and the issues in 
th[e] case would . . . be more appropriately settled in a civil forum.” State v. Conrad, 2017 ND 79, 
¶ 10, 892 N.W.2d 200, 203 (quoting State v. Curtis, 2008 ND 108, ¶ 24, 750 N.W.2d 438, 445).   
371. Cf. Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary 
Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 960, 976 (2006) (surveying 
testamentary capacity cases adjudicated in the nineteenth century). 
372. For similar reasons, we (somewhat grudgingly) propose that states use the common law 
definition of undue influence if they decide not to abolish the crime. Although the rule is deeply 
flawed, it is nevertheless familiar. Conversely, the contours of a unique criminal version of undue 
influence are anyone’s guess.  
373. FLA. STAT. § 825.101(8) (2020); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-68-1(6) (2020).  
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capacity . . . in the law”374 and “does not depend upon the testatrix’s 
ability to reason logically.”375 Thus, in states with idiosyncratic criminal 
definitions of mental capacity, a beneficiary’s acceptance of a bequest 
from a decedent who is moderately impaired might violate criminal law 
even though the instrument itself would be enforceable in probate. 
To make this point concrete, recall McCay v. State: the dispute over 
Mary Ellen Bendtsen’s will, which we mentioned in the Introduction.376 
Mark McCay, a would-be beneficiary, was convicted of attempted theft.377 
In Texas, theft occurs when the defendant knows that the owner has 
difficulty making “rational decisions about the reasonable disposition of 
property.”378 But in probate, a testator only lacks capacity to make a will 
“in extreme cases of imbecility.”379 In fact, the evidence about Bendtsen’s 
acuity in the probate trial was mixed,380 and the judge never actually ruled 
that she was incompetent.381 Therefore, McCay might have been sent to 
prison for trying to probate a binding will.382 
Thus, states should import the civil test for incapacity into the black-
letter rule for estate theft.383 And as we explain next, they should also scale 
back their abuser laws. 
 
374. Whitaker v. McDonnell (In re Estate of Elias), 946 N.E.2d 1015, 1028 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); 
see also Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998) (“The degree of mental capacity required 
to make a will is minimal.”); In re Will of Goldberg, 582 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (“It is 
hornbook law that less mental capacity is required to execute a will than any other legal instrument.”); 
see also supra text accompanying note 66.  
375. In re Perkins’ Estate, 235 P. 45, 49 (Cal. 1925); see also Jensen v. Molgaard, 240 N.W. 656, 
657–58 (Minn. 1932) (“[T]he testator may make an unjust, unreasonable, and unfair will if 
he chooses.”). 
376. See supra text accompanying notes 1–25. 
377. See supra text accompanying notes 22–25. 
378. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(3)(E) (West 2020). 
379. Rich v. Rich, 615 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. App. 1980).  
380. See Post-Submission Letter Brief at 2, McCay v. State, 476 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App. 2015) 
(No. 05-12-01199-CR), 2015 WL 1827197, at *2 (explaining how there was testimony that Bendsten 
was nearly comatose, but hospital personnel also considered her capable of consenting to a “Do Not 
Resuscitate” form).  
381. See In re Estate of Bendtsen, 230 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Tex. App. 2007); McCay, 476 S.W.3d 
at 645. 
382. To be clear, that danger was not actually present under the facts of the case, because the will 
was invalid for lack of proper witnessing. See supra text accompanying note 19. But if it were not for 
that technicality, the dispute would have thrust the divergence between criminal and civil definitions 
of incapacity into sharp relief. 
383. As noted in section II.B, some judges in estate theft cases have been troubled by the 
granularity of civil incapacity doctrines. Yet these principles reflect careful policy judgments. For 
example, requiring greater mental sharpness to execute a gift or a contract—rather than a will—makes 
sense because presently-effective transfers deplete the donor’s assets and thus can cause greater harm 
than revocable instruments. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69.  
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C. Abuser Safe Harbors 
This section contends that abuser statutes can be constitutionally and 
normatively deficient. It thus urges legislatures to fix these flaws by 
subjecting these laws to the antilapse doctrine and carving out exceptions 
to the disinheritance penalty. 
Recall that the vast majority of courts have rejected forfeiture and 
corruption of blood challenges to the slayer rule.384 The most common 
ground for these holdings is the “owned interest” rationale: if the victim 
either died intestate or made a will or a revocable trust, then the 
perpetrator never had a vested right in the estate to forfeit.385 
Alternatively, to cover assets that the killer actually owned, such as 
irrevocable trusts and joint tenancies, judges fall back on the “murder 
profiteering” theory.386 The logic here is that the slayer doctrine does not 
punish felons for being felons; rather, it prevents unjust enrichment by 
denying criminals the spoils of their crime.387 
The abuser rule is more constitutionally perilous than the slayer 
doctrine. First, some abuser legislation covers assets in which the 
perpetrator enjoys existing rights. For example, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Oregon, and Washington either preclude an abuser from taking “any 
property, benefit, or other interest”388 or inheriting from the victim “by 
will, by transfer on death deed, by trust, or otherwise.”389 The plain 
language of these statutes includes assets held in irrevocable trusts, which 
provide “beneficiaries with ‘a vested and present beneficial interest.’”390 
Likewise, West Virginia bars abusers from pocketing “any interest in the 
money or property[] from the victim . . . by descent and distribution, or by 
will, or by any policy or certificate of insurance, or otherwise.”391 The 
state supreme court has interpreted this language to include the criminal’s 
 
384. See supra section I.B. 
385. See supra text accompanying notes 147–152. 
386. See supra text accompanying notes 159–161.  
387. See supra text accompanying notes 160–161.  
388. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-6 (2020); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280(1) (West 2020) 
(providing that an abuser “forfeits all interest in and to the property of the decedent”); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 11.84.020 (2020) (“No slayer or abuser shall in any way acquire any property or receive any 
benefit as the result of the death of the decedent.”).  
389. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.465(1) (2020). 
390. United States v. Harris, 854 F.3d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Empire Properties v. 
Cnty. of L.A., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 1996)). Other abuser statutes are tailored to only 
apply to “revocable” dispositions of property, and thus exclude irrevocable trusts. See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 46-456(2)(a) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2803(2)(a)(i) (2020).  
391. W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2(c) (2020).  
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share of assets held in joint tenancy.392 Because these laws might force 
abusers to forfeit their own property, they cannot always be upheld under 
the owned interest rationale. 
In addition, the murder profiteering theory does not apply to abuser 
legislation. This perspective casts the slayer doctrine not as an attainder-
like punishment for the crime, but rather as an attempt to prevent unjust 
enrichment. Its central insight is that because the killing sets the wheels 
of inheritance in motion, the slayer rule merely restores the status quo by 
depriving the perpetrator of assets that “have a nexus to the criminal 
act.”393 But in sharp contrast, abuse—no matter how heinous—rarely 
enriches the culprit.394 Thus, when a court disinherits an abuser, it causes 
the surrender of property that has no logical relationship to the underlying 
misdeeds.395 Because abuser laws do not avert ill-gotten gains, they are 
just like the vanquished doctrines of forfeiture and corruption of blood in 
the sense that they are entirely punitive.396 Accordingly, when applied to 
common fact patterns, these statutes may be unconstitutional.397 
 
392. See Lakatos v. Estate of Billotti, 509 S.E.2d 594, 598 (W. Va. 1998) (construing the same 
language in the state’s slayer statute to mean that “upon the death of the victim, the total estate held 
in a joint tenancy passes in its entirety to the person or persons who would have taken the same if the 
slayer had predeceased the victim”). Conversely, several states allow the abuser to retain her share of 
property held in joint tenancy or community property with right of survivorship. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 46-456(c)(3); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-6.2; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2803(b); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 112.475(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.050(1).  
393. Fellows, supra note 32, at 544.  
394. Although physical abuse, verbal abuse, and neglect do not put money in the abuser’s pocket, 
financial exploitation is more complex. As the discussion in Part II, makes clear, heirs and 
beneficiaries who commit pecuniary misconduct sometimes divert estate property to their own use. 
However, the victim or her estate can obtain a remedy for this wrongdoing through a separate civil 
lawsuit against the abuser. The abuser rule takes the additional punitive step of deleting the perpetrator 
from the victim’s estate plan. Thus, even financial exploitation does not have the same direct causal 
link between the crime and the criminal’s profit that a murder does. 
395. Admittedly, this analysis does not apply to California’s and Maryland’s abuser statutes, which 
are designed to make the estate whole rather than punish the offender. See supra text accompanying 
notes 297–298. 
396. Courts have found similar rules to be unconstitutional for precisely this reason: because they 
imposed forfeitures on property that “was not the fruit of crime nor acquired in the pursuance of 
criminal activity.” Leonard v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 479, 488, 503 P.2d 741, 747 (1972).   
397. We say “may” because a handful of courts have used rationales other than the owned interest 
or murder profiteering theories to uphold slayer statutes. For example, some judges have reasoned 
that the prohibition on forfeiture only applies when the government confiscates property. See 
Blodgett v. Blodgett (In re Estate of Blodgett), 147 P.3d 702, 711 (Alaska 2006); Houser v. Haven, 
225 S.W.2d 559, 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949) (“The state is making no effort to confiscate the proceeds 
of the [life insurance] policy.”); Shields v. Shields (In re Estate of Shields), 584 P.2d 139, 142 (Kan. 
1978) (McFarland, J., dissenting) (“The statute in question does not authorize any forfeiture of the 
estate to the government upon conviction.”). In addition, at least one court has opined that a criminal 
penalty is not a “forfeiture” unless it divests a criminal of all of her property. See Blodgett, 147 P.3d 
at 710–11. Because none of these opinions have discussed these alternative justifications in depth, it 
is unclear whether they would survive close scrutiny.  
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The disconnect between the crime and the penalty highlights another 
flaw with abuser statutes. As mentioned, the slayer doctrine accomplishes 
two complementary goals: it punishes the killer and it effectuates the 
victim’s likely desire to disinherit the killer.398 But abuser laws have the 
potential to penalize an owner’s friend or family member for an isolated 
altercation or lapse in judgment.399 There is no guarantee that a victim 
would have responded to relatively trivial misconduct with such a heavy 
hammer.400 Thus, abuser legislation can actually thwart a 
decedent’s intent. 
To solve these dilemmas, abuser statutes should boast two features. 
First, they should incorporate the antilapse doctrine. As noted, in some 
states, antilapse takes the sting out of the slayer rule by allocating the 
killer’s inheritance to the killer’s descendants.401 This palliative also helps 
square the disinheritance penalty with the injunction against corruption of 
blood—the incident of attainder that was anathema to the Founders.402 As 
the Washington Court of Appeals recognized in Eaden v. Evans (In re 
Estate of Evans)403—the only opinion to consider whether antilapse 
applies to abusers—keeping the decedent’s property within the abuser’s 
family avoids punishing the abuser’s “innocent descendants.”404 
Second, disinheritance should be discretionary, rather than automatic. 
As noted, only three jurisdictions allow courts to mold the penalty to 
conform to the crime.405 Yet this minority approach has big upsides. For 
 
398. See supra text accompanying notes 136–138. 
399. See supra text accompanying notes 304–311.  
400. We concede that one factor helps diminish this risk. Unlike the slayer rule, which generally 
permits probate courts to find by a preponderance of the evidence that a felonious and intentional 
killing occurred, most abuser statutes predicate disinheritance on a criminal conviction of elder abuse. 
See supra text accompanying notes 299–301. The filters of the criminal justice system—such as the 
choice to devote resources to prosecution and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at trial—may 
weed out all but the most galling abuser claims.  
401. See supra text accompanying notes 167–168.  
402. See supra text accompanying notes 114–115.  
403. 181 Wash. App. 436, 326 P.3d 755 (2014).  
404. Id. at 447, 326 P.3d at 761. In Evans, Calvin Evans, Sr. (“Cal Sr.”) had four children, including 
Calvin Evans, Jr (“Cal Jr.”). See id. at 439, 326 P.3d at 757. When Cal Sr. was diagnosed with 
dementia, Cal Jr. took care of him. See id. Cal Sr. executed a will which left most of his property to 
Cal Jr. See id. at 440, 326 P.3d at 757. But Cal Jr. also used his father’s money to buy several items 
for his own use. See id. at 439–40, 326 P.3d at 757. The trial court held that Cal Jr. had committed 
financial exploitation and thus was disinherited. See id. at 441, 326 P.3d at 758. However, the trial 
judge invoked antilapse to pass Cal Jr.’s share to his own children. See id. The court of appeals 
affirmed, reasoning that the abuser statute “is not intended to be penal” and that “any incidental 
benefit” that an abuser reaps from his wrongdoing “does not warrant denying benefits to the abuser’s 
innocent heirs.” Id. at 447–48, 326 P.3d at 760–61. Accordingly, Cal Jr.’s kids took his share under 
Cal. Sr.’s will. See id. at 450, 326 P.3d at 762.  
405. See supra text accompanying notes 312–313. 
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one, it increases the odds of abuser laws surviving constitutional scrutiny. 
For instance, a court could surgically excise property in which the abuser 
has a vested right and thus defuse forfeiture objections. Similarly, judges 
could decline to disinherit offenders in cases like Newman v. Newman406: 
where the abuser made great personal sacrifices to shepherd the victim 
through her cancer treatment and “the evidence was overwhelming as to 
their mutual love and devotion.”407 Giving courts this power would create 
a safety valve for situations in which revoking the transfer to the abuser 
flouts the victim’s likely wishes. 
CONCLUSION 
The civil justice system has long grappled with the worst evidence 
problem, the empty shell of undue influence, and the intricacies of the 
slayer rule. This Article has revealed that these principles have recently 
seeped into the field of criminal law. Innovations like estate theft, criminal 
undue influence, and the abuser rule help stem the rising tide of 
inheritance-related misconduct. Yet they can also be unconstitutional, 
generate injustice, and run roughshod over a decedent’s intent. States 
should calibrate punitive probate rules with an eye not just on their 
benefits, but also their costs. 
 
 
406. See supra text accompanying notes 305–311. 
407. Newman Reply Brief, supra note 288, at 15. 
